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This thesis is a theoretical exploration of the problem of the neighbour as an encounter with the 
Grey Zone. I look at various materials that can be formulated as expressions of the anxiety over 
the unknown that can come out in confrontation with problematic neighbours. Using an 
interpretive lens that recognizes the fundamental ambiguity in any speech (Blum 2010, Bonner 
1997, 1998) I attempt to show how such talk is grounded in the problem of anxiety in the face 
of the unknown. I begin with an analysis of city life and problem neighbours in general, I then 
move to a theoretical discussion of the problem that !i"ek’s formulation of the Neighbour as 
Other and Raffel’s discussion of a shared world brings out. I then look at the problem of a 
specific kind of bad neighbour, a methadone clinic can have in terms of the experience of 
parenting, and how this is articulated in some theoretical writings on city life. I then turn to an 
analysis of the proverbial fence as a solution to the Neighbour, followed by an analysis of the 
Russell Williams case as a call to revisit the problem of the Neighbour in relation to the Grey 
Zone. Though seemingly disconnected, all the cases I deal with can be understood as part of a 
conversation on the relation of health, neighbourliness and anxiety in the city to the problem of 
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The Grey Zone is a figure of speech meant to collect the essential ambiguity 
intrinsic to all social phenomena as it becomes topical in mundane ways (say, 
through the ideas of uncertainty, or “noise” in communication theory, or 
conventionally in clichés about limits of totality, or supposed “gaps” between 
subjective and objective, ideal and actual), or on critical occasions or crises when 
our inability to completely master events becomes apparent. The Grey Zone is 
based upon a proverbial sense of the distinction between “black and white” 
dualistic thinking that posits unambiguous alternatives as if choosing between them 
is the fundamental ambiguity (either/or) and a more pervasive sense of irresolution 
that haunts all words and deeds (Blum 2010, 18) 
 
In this thesis, I examine the problem of the desire to experience a knowable world and the 
anxiety brought out by uncertainty through an analysis of talk about problem neighbours. The 
problem of the neighbour that I am bringing out is not a problem with any particular neighbour, 
or a bad neighbour, rather, I try to show that simply having a neighbour—any neighbour—is 
problematic for an individual. I look at this problem in the context of health and its enigmatic 
(Gadamer 1996) existence that is made visible in city life (Blum 2010).  The connection 
between the problem of the neighbour and what Alan Blum calls the Grey Zone of health is 
multi-layered. I will begin with a discussion of how a problem neighbour can be formulated as 
a health problem. Later I will look at the deep problem represented in talk about problem 
neighbours and show how it brings to the fore the fundamental problem of the grey zone, which 
is also brought out in talk about health problems in general and especially in talk about health 
problems in the context of city life.  
The connection between neighbours and health here is three-fold:  
1. A problem neighbour (or any neighbour) can be formulated in academic and lay talk as 
a health problem. 
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2. The deep problem of the neighbour shares the form of the deep problem of health and 
illness— as something fundamental that we need to resolve in so far as we live with 
neighbours but something enigmatic. 
3. Methodologically speaking, my approach to the talk about neighbours is one that relies 
on a notion of diagnosis and healing, loosely inspired by Freud’s psychoanalysis and the 
self reflective analysis of McHugh et al. In other words it is assumed that complaints 
about neighbours are symptomatic of a deeper problem that is hidden in the text and my 
task as the theorist is to uncover these “real” problems, and orient to how the problems 
might be healed (and conversely, what approaches might exacerbate them). 
In this what follows, I discuss the concept of the neighbour as a health risk. I consider the ideas 
that ground the notion that other people can be bad for us, and I talk about what version of 
health allows for such a notion to find its home. I do this through analyzing what underlies talk 
about neighbours as a risk to our health and I try to show the version of the world that this kind 
of talk takes for granted. In this paper I am attempting to uncover the deeper problem 
embedded in talk about the relation between health and our relations with our neighbours- a 
problem that goes beyond that of how to protect ourselves from the danger of the bad 
neighbour.  
In the first chapter, I address the idea of a deep problem, and I outline the method 
needed to engage such a problem. I argue that what underlies the talk is a desire to experience a 
knowable world, a desire that is interrupted by the neighbour, an interruption that city life 
allows.   
I introduce ordinary talk about the bad neighbour taken from newspapers and blogs in 
chapter 2. I work through this material in relation to health using social theorists such as 
3 
 
Gadamer, Blum, Bonner, among others. I do this with a mind to strengthen the tension between 
the neighbour and health. I develop the idea that the neighbour can cause an experience of 
anxiety, which can have the effect of making one ill. Anxiety in the face of the neighbour, and 
attempts to deal with it can generate hysteria and hysterical solutions to the problem. I look at 
this hysteria with an aim to show how it is reflective of the deep problem that the neighbour, 
particularly in the city, exposes one to the gap between what is known and unknown. As an 
experience, this is both painful and frustrating. I argue that attempts to “deal” with a problem 
neighbour are hysterical reactions to the deep problem of an encounter with what Blum calls 
the Grey Zone. I attempt to show how complaints about a neighbour and hysterical attempts to 
deal with a problem neighbour are symptoms of the need to feel at home in the city, a place that 
gives a home to anxiety, and the bad neighbour as well.  
 In the third chapter, I develop and work out the deep problem of the neighbour through 
an analysis of writings by theorists Stanley Raffel and Slavoj !i"ek. I formulate each theorist as 
providing an answer to the problem of anxiety in the face of the neighbour, and the problems 
this has in relation to a desire to experience a knowable world at home. In placing these 
theorists in dialogue with each other, I attempt to work out the problems articulated in chapter 
one, using the radical interpretive method (Bonner, 1998, 1999). In so doing, new and difficult 
questions regarding the place of neighbourliness in the city are able to emerge. I briefly discuss 
education and departure as possible reactions to the problem neighbour, and explore some of 
the practical, ethical and political considerations (Bonner 1998) of each.  
 In the fourth chapter, I explore the role of the city as a home of diversity in relation to 
the problem of feeling at home in the city. I do this through an analysis of classic and 
contemporary theoretical writings that can be read as articulate expressions of the problem of 
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the sometimes painful encounter with diversity that is part of city life, and the anxiety this can 
generate. As an illustration and case, I look at some talk about an unwanted methadone clinic in 
a middle class neighbourhood.  
  The fifth chapter is an analysis of the proverb “good fences make good neighbours.” I 
read it as an answer to the pain of the anxiety in the face of the unknown that the neighbour 
brings out in the social actor. I look at the proverb in terms of its implicit and explicit 
recommendations for neighbourliness. I look at the idea of the fence as a barrier against the 
influence of the neighbour, and what this kind of action does to the neighbour relation, and the 
problem of anxiety. I explore the proverbial fence in terms of its function of maintaining a 
knowable and understandable home in a world shared with the other. I move beyond questions 
of effectiveness and function to an analysis of what barriers do to a relational problem, and I 
assess their usefulness and relevance to the deep problem the neighbour presents us with in the 
city.  
 I conclude by reengaging the neighbour- even the bad neighbour- in relation to the Grey 
Zone of health and illness. In this chapter, the fundamental ambiguity we encounter in the 
neighbour is the subject, and I look at writings that speak to this ambiguity and its experience 
as aids in articulating such an experience, with particular focus on the Russell Williams murder 
case.  I attempt to develop a strong orientation to health in relation to the desire to experience 




Chapter 1. The Interpretive Paradigm and the Grey Zone 
Prior to any analysis, it is worth further discussing and outlining the paradigm within which the 
work I do in this thesis takes place. Rather than exploring the problem of the neighbour from an 
empirical or objective standpoint, this work fits within an interpretive model of sociological 
analysis. The caveats of this way of knowing are nicely summarized in the following passage 
by Littlejohn1: 
For the interpretive scholar, knowledge cannot be discovered intact because reality 
is not independent of the human mind. Although a set of knowable events are 
assumed to exist, those events can be conceptualized in a variety of useful ways and 
can never be ascertained purely without the imposition of a set of concepts by the 
knower. Thus knowledge is a transactional product of the knower and the known. 
Different observers will see different things in the stream of events because they 
assign different meanings to those events and conceptualize them in different ways. 
What mediates between knower and known, then, is a perspective, and knowledge 
is always colored by that perspective. Objectivity as defined in the classical 




Littlejohn argues that an interpretive approach prevents any sort of objective discovery because 
of the caveat that reality does not exist independently of the mind. While we can assume to 
know an object or an event, such objects and events can be conceptualized in many ways and 
can never be understood without the aid of some sort of perspective. He describes knowledge in 
the interpretive paradigm as “a transactional product of the knower and the known.” This 
means that what is seen and understood depends on who is doing the understanding as different 
observers will conceptualize an event and assign meaning differently, depending on their life 
                                                
1 I was introduced to Littlejohn’s Interpretive-Discovery dichotomy in Kieran Bonner’s 
undergraduate and graduate lectures. He uses it as a way of demonstrating to students the 
fundamentally different ways of knowing each paradigm allows. I read this exact passage for 
the first time in Bonner’s (1997) study on the urban-rural divide in a section outlining his own 
“Radical Interpretive” approach to sociological inquiry. 
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experience, culture, history, etc. He argues that for the interpretive scholar, any knowledge is 
“coloured” by the perspective of the observer, and therefore, the kind of objectivity strived for 
in the scientific paradigm is not a useful pursuit.  
What Littlejohn’s passage leaves us with is a notion of ambiguity that is part of 
anything said, studied or understood. If we accept what he says, then what is called for is a 
method of analysis that incorporates fogginess (as Bonner might say) into its canon. Or, put 
differently, what we need is a method that treats as its subject the underlying and hidden 
meanings that allow anything to be said, rather than a method that takes speech at face value.  
A Method of Analysis 
To analyze is... to address the possibility of any finding, puzzle, sense, resolution, 
answer, interest, location, phenomenon, etcetera, etcetera. Analysis is the concern 
not with anything said or written but with the grounds of whatever is said – the 
foundations that make what is said possible, sensible, conceivable (McHugh et al. 
1974, 2)  
 
McHugh et al (1974) offer a version of a social analysis that is concerned with the foundational 
knowledge that makes any speech possible or sensible, rather than the speech itself. I will 
attempt to formulate this thesis in the spirit of their version of analysis. The work for this study 
will also draw heavily from the similar traditions of “radical interpretive sociology” developed 
by Bonner (1997, 1998), and the phenomenology and hermeneutic inquiry outlined by van 
Manen (2007).  For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the above-mentioned methods as 
interpretive methods. I should also point out that my use of the term interpretive methods is 
specific to the (“radical”) traditions above, and I am not merely referring to all qualitative work 
in sociology.  
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 That this is not a traditional qualitative study should be emphasized. While I conducted 
a few informal and short interviews, the material I analyze comes from many sources: scholarly 
works, newspapers, blogs and fiction. My interest is not to test any claim made in the data I am 
using, but to uncover the various hidden assumptions, which would allow anyone to understand 
a particular claim as a sensible one to make.  Thus, to say, “x is a bad neighbour and he’s 
ruining my life,” is grounded in a certain understanding of the dependence of one’s health on 
one’s relations with others, especially those with whom one has frequent contact with, such as a 
neighbour. The statement is also grounded in a specific understanding of what a neighbour is, 
what it is not, what it could possibly be, and what it should be. On one level, my analysis is 
intended as an examination of what makes possible the understanding that a bad neighbour 
might make us ill, but it also is an attempt to examine and demonstrate what it means to 
theorize. 
If to analyze is to address the possibility of anything said, then anything said opens 
itself up for analysis. The quality of the analysis under these auspices cannot be tied to an 
external notion of the accuracy of data. Good data can no longer be defined as that which best 
reflects something real. Good data are good insofar as they animates the ambiguity that is at the 
heart of anything said. The rigour, so to speak, in this work lies in the authors ability to 
theorize, which, according to Bonner (1997) involves saying something about the subject of 
inquiry, and at the same time, being reflective about how one’s own conceptualizations 
influence what is seen as significant. Thus the quotes that introduced this chapter as well as 
material from blogs, social theorists and fiction provides an opportunity to re-engage the 
problem of the place of neighbourliness in relation to health in city life.   
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The Grey Zone 
 What the above method leads to is a recognition of the fundamentally ambiguous nature 
of any object, be it health, city or the neighbour. The nature of any speech is that it hides the 
grounds that allow it to be said in the first place. My treatment of the texts I analyze and my 
orientation to the problem of the neighbour as a health risk comes from a theoretical framework 
that recognizes the enigmatic character that underlies all interpretations and descriptions of any 
phenomenon- be it health, illness, neighbours or city life. The method of analysis that I use in 
this paper assumes that any speech about any phenomenon references something fundamentally 
ambiguous and never completely comprehensible. The following quote, taken from the CHIR 
proposal for the Grey Zone project, shows Alan Blum’s notion of the Grey Zone, which I also 
intend to take as a fundamental assumption in this paper: 
The Grey Zone is not a physical location but an interpretive space, the irresolute 
aura of metaphysics that is ‘interior’ to any conclusive action and that haunts it as 
an unspoken background. The Grey Zone is necessary in the sense that all action 
and interpretation has to assume matters that it cannot master through further 
information retrieval and computation, matters of value and relevance that remain 
unstated presuppositions in its decision-making and calculation of options and 
risks. 
 
 This definition points to a version of the nature of human action and interpretation 
which relies on assumed but unarticulated understandings of what is valuable and important, as 
well as what is irrelevant. The Grey Zone of health references the idea that health is one such 
area where an understanding of what it is cannot be reached solely through empirical 
investigation. In fact, as Gadamer (1996) points out, the act of quantitatively measuring health 
has the effect of making the one whose health is measured, unhealthy:  
The fundamental fact remains that it is illness and not health which ‘objectifies’ 
itself, which confronts us as something opposed to us and which forces itself on 
us.... Once again we must address the fact that the real mystery lies in the hidden 
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character of health. Health does not actually present itself to us. Of course one can 
also attempt to establish standard values for health. But the attempt to impose these 
standard values on a health individual would only result in making that person ill. It 
lies in the nature of health that it sustains its own proper balance and proportion. 
The appeal to standard values which are derived by averaging out different 
empirical data and then simply applied to particular cases is inappropriate to 
determining health and cannot be forced upon it. 
 (107) 
 
The experience of health, according to Gadamer, allows forgetfulness on the part of the actor. 
The natural state of balance that characterizes health keeps it from objectifying itself to the 
actor in the way that the disturbance of illness does. Thus, attempts to understand health 
objectively through empirical measurement, cannot account for a true (whole) version of what 
health is, and they can in effect destroy the experience of health (the ability to forget about it) 
by unnaturally imposing the objective standards that health resists.  The implication is that 
empirical knowledge can measure symptoms, but cannot adequately account for what health is, 
even though it relies on some common understanding of the nature of health.  
 In the following chapters I explore the Grey Zone of health as it appears in conflicts 
with neighbours that are symptomatic of an underlying deep problem of the anxiety we 
experience in any encounter with the unknown. The chapters should be regarded as distinct in 
terms of the cases they present (neighbours in the city, theoretical discourse sharing the world, 
a methadone clinic, the proverbial fence, and the truly horrifying neighbour) but each is tied 
together by the theme of bringing to the fore the deep problem of the fundamental gap between 
the known and the unknown, and the anxiety in the face of this gap. The analysis seeks to 




Structure of the Chapters 
I should speak here to the fact that this thesis is not organized in the traditional way that many 
works of sociology are. Sociological studies often follow a standard format beginning with the 
introduction, the establishment of the problem and research questions, a chapter on theory, a 
chapter on methods, chapters where data is analyzed, followed by a conclusion. My thesis is 
not structured in this way for a variety of important reasons: 
 First, my research was more generative than inductive or deductive in particular. What I 
try to do in this work is look at the problem of anxiety in the face of the neighbour as it appears 
in talk about neighbours. The problem needs to be kept alive and confronted throughout the 
work, rather than stated at the beginning, and “solved” in the end. 
 Second, part of what makes this kind of work distinctive is the interrelation between 
theory and methods (Bonner 1998, 1999). To separate a discussion of theory from method 
would be to go against the reflexive principles that I am trying to demonstrate. To separate 
questions of theory or method from the analysis of material itself would do the same. My thesis 
should be seen as engaging theory, method and analysis in to a single narrative on the problem 
of the neighbour.  In so far as it can be understood as orienting to the problem of anxiety in the 
face of the unknown, theory needs to be placed directly in a conversation rather than outside of 
it. Theory and methods inform analysis, and the data analyzed informs the kinds of method and 
theory which is used (Littlejohn 1989). To separate each in to different chapters would be 
artificial and it would be in contradiction to the fundamental assumption that both theory and 
methods are tightly interrelated (Bonner 1998, 1999).  
 Third, this thesis as a whole examines the problem of anxiety in relation to the 
neighbour along the lines of the hermeneutic circle (see Bonner 1998). This reflects an 
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orientation and commitment to look at the problem of the neighbour from moving back and 
forth between the general and particular. What begins to develop resembles more of a story or a 
conversation than a scientific study. As Bonner puts it in describing why he chose to write his 
book Power and Parenting in a conversational format: 
Because interpretation is guided by the concern of allowing the phenomenon to 
speak to the interpreter, my narrative stimulates the process (as against the mere 
result) of uncovering the problem of power in contemporary parenting. Conversation 
brings together the personal style, the theoretic approach and the practical content. 
What this process looks like becomes more apparent as the narrative proceeds (1998, 
152). 
 
While it might appear illogical or haphazard to anyone with a strict version of how a thesis in 
sociology should look, there is a real logic to how I lay out my work in this piece, as well as the 
kinds of material I use. What I sought to do was bring different theories in to conversation with 
each other about the problem of the neighbour. The following three chapters, the first on 
neighbours in the city , the second, a discourse between Raffel and Zizek and the third, theory 
on the city and talk about methadone, should all be seen as showing a problem – that of anxiety 
in the face of the neighbour. The two chapters which follow deepen this conversation to include 
notions of how we should act, and how we should heal in relation to the problem of the 
neighbour. The logic is in where each story fits in the narrative, rather than its classification as 
a certain kind of talk (e.g. methodology or theory) and everything I analyze was selected in 
terms of how it allowed ambiguity and the Grey Zone to appear in a particular way. While the 
scientific paradigm would see this as problematic, this is how knowledge in the interpretive 




Chapter 2. The Neighbour as a Health Risk 
Quote A 
In many neighbourhood surveys …individuals expressed concerns related to the 
types of people or behaviour in the neighbourhood: for instance, the need for more 
homeowners, and a dislike of street people and antisocial behaviour.... Additionally, 
individuals living in areas where they feel unsafe may deem those areas unhealthy 
for themselves and others (i.e. they may feel anxious and restricted in terms of their 
freedom to get about). Safety is related to quality of life, neighbourhood satisfaction 
and social capital ... 
Chappell and Funk, 2004 
 
Quote B 
Neglected neighbourhoods and untrustworthy neighbours may be bad for your 
heart. In a large study of middle aged adults, Harvard researchers found that women 
were more likely to develop calcification in their heart arteries if they lived in such 
deprived environments compared to women who lived in more well-to-do and 
cohesive neighbourhoods.  
Montreal Gazzette, July 2010 
 
 
The idea that your neighbour affects your health underlies many of the current public health 
campaigns against everything from the use of pesticides to smoking on patios, to the flu 
vaccine. Such campaigns share an interest in protecting oneself from those nearby (the polluter, 
the smoker, the cougher), and protecting others from the self (in reminding that our actions 
affect our neighbours, families and children). Quotes A and B above reference the health risk 
presented to us merely in having a neighbour who is disagreeable- even if his or her 
disagreeability does not come from her being infected with the flu, or being a smoker, or a user 
of pesticides. These two studies reflect a notion that people who are simply not like us – the 
antisocials, the street people, the untrustworthy, the renters, and anyone else who may not be 
easy to like – can be spoken of as presenting a risk to our health. In this chapter I work through 
talk about the bad neighbour with an aim to uncover the deeper problem that such talk 
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conceals. I argue that the deep problem embedded in such material is an encounter with the 
unknown that generates anxiety, hysteria and hysterical attempts at a solution.  
 
Health 
Health connotes a natural balance and harmony, and it is experienced when we are able to 
forget it. What needs to be worked out immediately in any attempt to understand health is a 
way of understanding that would lend itself more naturally to a concern for health than illness. 
While enigmatic, we do actually experience health, in the form of a general sense of well-being 
(Gadamer, 1996, 112):  
Despite its hidden character health none the less manifests itself in a general feeling 
of well-being. It shows itself above all where such a feeling of well-being means 
we are open to new things, ready to embark on new enterprises and, forgetful of 
ourselves, scarcely notice the demands and strains which are put on us. This is what 
health is. 
 
We can translate this sense of well-being to an experience of openness or freedom. Free from a 
particular illness, but also free to live the way we would like.  The freedom in health comes 
from being able to ignore health all together. In Gadamer’s words, health is “a condition of 
inner accord, of harmony with oneself that cannot be overridden by other, external forms of 
control” (1996, 108). That is to say, when we are healthy, we are not thinking about how we 
feel and it is when our freedom to simply “be” is challenged – by pain, by a symptom, etc. – do 
we begin to talk about illness. Illness therefore is experienced in terms of the limits it places on 





1) a person, institution, etc., resident or established next door to or near or nearest 
to another  
2a) a person or thing near or next to another 
b) a country etc. adjacent to or near another. 
c) a resident of such a country etc. 
3) a person regarded as a fellow human being, especially as entitled to kindness, 
compassion, consideration, etc (Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 1998) 
 
 Neighbours can be individuals or institutions. They can be defined through a notion of physical 
placement and depend on a notion of residency or placedness. Neighbours can be groups and 
individuals in groups. Parts one and two of the definition contain a recipe for recognizing 
neighbours. Part three of the definition is more political. Whereas the first two parts show how 
we recognize a neighbour, the third shows how we treat a neighbour. Thus a neighbour can be a 
“person or a thing” but the word neighbour implies also a fellowship and an entitlement to 
kindness compassion and consideration on the part of others. Thus, the statement “we are 
neighbours” seems redundant as fact (if we are next to each other, it should be obvious) but 
useful as a political appeal (in remembering we are neighbours, let us behave respectfully 
towards each other).  
 The concept of the neighbour implies a relation, and it implies sharing. The above 
statements formulate the neighbour as a risk to health in situations where sharing is not easy – 
either because there is not much to share, as in the case of poor neighbourhoods, or when the 
people we are to share with are completely other to us. Both quotes describe a desire to be 
among similar people, and the assumption seems to be that in turn individuals will feel safer 
and therefore healthier.  
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 It seems that the talk in quotes A and B relies on an assumption that there is a 
relationship between health and the extent to which we feel at home. Feeling at home seems to 
rely on a notion of freedom to be ourselves, and to conduct ourselves without consideration of 
what is other to us. Otherness (in the form of a homeless person, renter or a bad neighbour in 
quote A presents more than an annoyance, but a stress which can negatively impact our 
physical and mental health. In the context of the city, where diversity and otherness are 
definitive of the urban way of life, the above quotes can be formulated as showing a concern 
how one is to experience being at home in the reality of a shared and diverse world.  
Freedom and Progress in the City 
The city can be seen as a site of technological advancement and it has been described as 
perhaps the one and only place where individuals can experience true freedom (Simmel 1971). 
In contrast to rural or suburban areas, the city is characterized by diversity and difference 
among individuals. The promise of the city for health is thus: Insofar as an experience of health 
requires an experience of freedom, the city provides a place to live healthily through providing 
a place where we can be truly free. Insofar as an orientation to health is an orientation to its 
maintenance, the city as a site of technological advancement in health care offers itself as a 
place where anyone concerned with keeping healthy might want to situate themselves.  
According to Georg Simmel, the city “assures the individual a type and degree of 
personal freedom to which there is no analogy in other circumstances”(1971, 332). The 
implication is that there is no other kind of place that allows one to be as free as in the city. To 
accept personal freedom as a condition of city life makes the notion of a suburb with certain 
“urban qualities” (characteristics) as an appropriate home for the individual who is committed 
to personal freedom, nonsensical. In other words, the recognition that freedom is a condition of 
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the city reveals that a commitment to personal freedom requires also a commitment to the city 
as a place that allows this freedom to be recognized.  
 And yet, we are bombarded with images such as those in quotes A and B: Images of the 
city as a place of disease and danger; as a place that creates the very health problems it has 
become a place for solving.  The city has a reputation of putting the health and wellbeing of its 
residence more at risk than if they were to live in the country (Herzlich 1973). This idea is at 
the heart of talk about the effects ones “way of life” can have on health. In being a home for 
diversity, intellectual and technological advancement and freedom, city life seems to produce a 
degree of stress not found in less populated settings. And stress is known to negatively affect 
both mental and physical health (Herzlich 1973, DeLongis et al 1988).  
Hysteria in the face of the Neighbour 
The following is an analysis of a story printed in the New York Times, which deals with the 
ordinary problem of bad neighbours in the city.  
 
His worst experience unfolded in the Brooklyn Heights co-op he bought in 1997 
and shared with his wife and two children: their upstairs neighbor’s newborn baby 
began crying for four to five hours a night.  
 “We were hysterical,” Mr. Splendore said. “We went upstairs and said, “Is there 
anything we can do to help you?” 
 The neighbors reacted defensively.  “They started to avoid us,” he said. “They 
were obviously not having any sleep either, and they were irrational.” 
 The baby finally calmed down, and that family finally moved on. In came a 
single European woman. “She just has no concept of how much sound could 
travel,” Mr. Splendore said. “She used to play rock music really loud.”  
 At other times, there were other noises, equally disturbing. “It sounded like she 
was dragging trunks,” he recalled. “And she wore big platform shoes that she 
would take off when she got home and throw them across the room one at a time. 
We literally waited for the shoe drop.” 
 A board emissary was dispatched, to little effect. 
Two months later, Mr. Splendore was startled awake in the wee hours by a 
‘gigantic crash’ overhead. He swore, leapt from bed and tore upstairs.  
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 “It sounds like the end of the world is going on here!” he said he told his 
neighbor when he confronted her at the door.  
 The neighbor apologized for dropping her television from what Mr. Splendore 
believed was a ladder. But he and his family had finally had enough. They sold the 
apartment and bought a house in Bay Ridge.  
(From New York Times article “The Last Straw” by Teri Kaursh Rogers, October 
22, 2006)  
 
 
I use this story as my entry into an analysis of the problem of the neighbour, because it 
demonstrates the tension between a desire to live in the city, and the desire for a peaceful and 
quiet home, something rarely experienced in city life. The story itself captures the frustration 
and hysterical reactions our neighbours can bring out in us, especially we experience their 
intrusion. Depending on how we read Mr. Splendore’s account, we can arrive at different 
conclusions as to who the bad neighbour is in this scenario.  If we subscribe to his account 
somewhat unreflexively, we can see him as a victim in a very pure sense. Here is a man who 
cannot find peace in the very place he needs it: his home. He paints a picture of practically 
being tortured by neighbours, and even though the torture techniques are mundane every day 
actions like a woman removing her shoes- most readers are able to relate to his plight. We feel 
for Mr. Splendore because we can relate to his desire to live in a home free of disruption. The 
home is where we perform many of the activities related to our survival and well-being. It is 
where we eat, rest, sleep. It is where we can have relief from the hectic and dangerous world 
outside. Thus the disturbance to one’s home is more than a mere annoyance. It is an injustice.  
 Mr. Splendore can be understood as someone who is suffering from an act of injustice. 
His neighbours, in robbing him of his right to peace and quiet in his own home can be 
formulated as perpetrators- even though their actions were in and of themselves, not 
particularly malicious or illegal.  
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 Stories like Mr. Splendore’s are the inspiration behind online communities dedicated to 
voicing concerns about bad neighbours and finding solutions to the problems caused by having 
bad neighbours. The British site Neighbours From Hell in Britain (NFHiB) which claims to be 
the world’s most popular website for people dealing with problem neighbours, describes itself 
as an online community that: 
 
exists to enable people who are suffering with similar problems to come together as 
a voice for change and most importantly as a means of supporting one another 
through what can be truly awful times that are often both physically and mentally 
exhausting. 
-NFHiB home page 
 
NFHiB contains hundreds of similar stories to Mr. Splendore’s, and sets out to raise awareness 
of the seriousness of the problems having a bad neighbour can cause:  
 
When you've got a neighbour who makes a lot of noise it's no joke, noise can 
intrude into every area of your life and can literally assault you with its un-
consenting effects. 
 Excessive noise affects your quality of life, it makes you jumpy, it makes you 
irritable, and it can prevent you from sleeping and cause many stressful side effects. 
 Noise has many forms - for most people who are living next door to a neighbour 
from hell, it'll be the boom boom boom of the heavy stereo music, the shouting and 
conversations they can maybe hear from their neighbours, the banging, crashing, 
DIY noise, car noise, car/house alarms, noise from parties and other gatherings, 
wooden floors, the list can go on and on. 
-http://nfh.org.uk/resources/Articles/noise/index.php 
 
A noisy neighbour is akin to a rapist: he intrudes and assaults you without your consent. A 
noisy neighbour is like a bad drug: he can make you jumpy, he can deprive you of sleep and 
cause stressful side effects.  The noise itself, despite any reason for such noise is what is 
harmful and, according to this article, what needs to be taken very seriously. The article allows 
us to see Mr. Splendore as a man made sick by his neighbours. The crying baby, the girl’s 
music, the throwing shoes, the dragging, the dropping, are all kinds of noise that have intruded 
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on his life and caused him considerable suffering.  His two outbursts at his neighbours seem 
justified, and the fact that he and his family eventually moved from the building resonates as 
completely unfair.   
 We can also imagine a somewhat different account of Mr. Splendore if we consider 
things from the point of view of his neighbours. Beginning with the couple and their newborn 
child, we have a situation of a man who is certainly not very understanding of the normal 
(though still disturbing) noises a baby is apt to make. Clearly, the building did not have an adult 
only rule (Mr. Splendore also lived there with his children), therefore it was likely to be a home 
for people with babies. And with babies, comes noise. This would be something Mr. Splendore 
would have to accept and prepare for, if he can be considered a reasonable man. We can relate 
to the defensiveness of a young couple, harassed by their neighbour for something that really is 
not in their power to control. Even in his own account, Mr. Splendore admits to being 
hysterical when he confronted the couple. Knowing this, his question “Is there anything we can 
do to help you?” reads more like an insult (“what is wrong with you that you can’t keep your 
child from crying every night?”) than an offer of assistance.  Not to mention that any 
reasonable person should know that often there is nothing we can do to stop an infant from 
crying her eyes out.  
 Mr. Splendore easily comes across as someone who is oversensitive to noise and 
perhaps prone to exaggeration. Such a type was described in another New York Times article:  
 
Like teenagers who cannot bear the sound of their parents chewing, New Yorkers, 
stacked one on top of another, have noise issues that no amount of nirvana and 
Integral Yoga will overcome. They raise their eyes to heaven as the neighbor’s 4-
year-old dumps out a crate of Legos; they accept that on Superbowl Sunday, they 
will hear groans and cheers from apartments on all sides. But New Yorkers do not 
want to hear any noise at all after 10 p.m., the magic time when the standard lease 




In this light, Mr. Splendore can simply be categorized as another unreasonable New Yorker, 
who is destined to be upset by pretty much any noise. It is almost as if there is no hope for him, 
and if we think about him as unreasonable and oversensitive, he does not really fit the picture 
of a character we would even want to help. He seems self-centered to the extreme (he cannot 
even put up with someone taking off their shoes once a day), quick to anger, and intolerant of 
human error (displayed by his willingness to yell at a woman who accidentally dropped a 
television). Eventually he gives up and moves to a house in Bay Ridge. Good riddance.  
 The point here is not to hash out every possible interpretation of Mr. Splendore’s 
actions or the actions of his neighbours. I am not arguing that any account is more just. They 
can all be considered true, depending on the lens of the interpreter (Bonner 1998, 1999). What 
is interesting in the case of Mr. Splendore and the possible interpretations of the case, is the 
underlying problem one is faced with in his or her relations with neighbours. In both versions 
of this story, actors are faced with a situation that forces them to work out a version of how one 
should live in their home. This includes ideas of the actions considered good, acceptable, and 
unacceptable in relation to those with whom you share a space. Problems arise when actors 
adhere to and act on conflicting versions of the right way to live. Thus, in this case, one 
neighbour’s idea of the right amount of noise might be experienced as an invasion akin to 
physical assault, and one neighbour’s particular tolerance levels might seem discriminatory and 
hateful.  
 If we resist taking sides in this case what begins to appear is the problem that living 
closely with others is potentially painful. Pain is often experienced in situations where one is 
prevented from enjoying their home. If the home is a place for the individual to shed the roles 
she takes on in public life and simply “be herself” than an enjoyable home is a place that allows 
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for an enjoyment of the unfiltered self. The disruption of the enjoyment of the self then is 
understandable in cases where people are restricted in terms of how much noise they can make, 
or people who are affected by too much noise from others.  
 The neighbour, therefore, always reminds us that even in our own homes we need to 
restrict the actions that might make us feel the most at home (blasting music, trampolining, 
vacuuming at 6am) and at the same time, holds the potential to impose themselves on our life 
should they choose not to (or see no need) to limit their own actions to the point that they do 
not affect others. This realization allows us to return to the Mr. Splendore case and treat it in a 
way that goes beyond simply seeing different perspectives.  The case reflects a problem 
requiring a deeper analysis than deciding who is in the right. City living requires a daily 
encounter with others, this is one of the aspects that makes city life interesting, vital and 
desirable. But as the Mr. Splendore case shows, the experience of sharing a space with a 
neighbour can be a painful experience. The presence of the neighbour always puts at risk one’s 
ability to feel at home, and consequently one’s health. We can now ask how one can embrace 
city life with the problem of health in relation to one’s neighbours in mind. This task requires 
an examination of how we are able to experience a home in the city, and the relation of 
neighbours to such an experience.  
Neighbourhoods  
In the city, we are able to speak of a neighbourhood not only in terms of its physical boundaries 
or the district it occupies, but in terms of the community it supports. Neighbourhood means 
more than an area or a space, it refers also to a culture that exists within such a space. 
Neighbourhood implies closeness in the realm of what is both physical and immaterial. While 
physical proximity is what makes the neighbourhood, we rarely hear neighbourhoods talked 
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about as simply physical spaces in the city. Often they are characterized by something that 
unifies those who call the neighbourhood home, but make the neighbourhood particular from 
other neighbourhoods- i.e. the gay neighbourhood in Vancouver’s West End or Toronto’s 
China Town. In other words, part of what defines any neighbourhood is the type of person who 
calls it her home.  
 In light of this, we can now see neighbourhoods might serve a deeper purpose in the 
city than dividing something large in to smaller and more manageable parts for garbage 
collection days or elections. Neighbourhoods make it possible to experience being at home in 
spite of the monstrousness diversity of the city.  The familiarity that defines a neighbourhood 
offers an answer to a desire for a knowable world. The concept of the neighbourhood is able to 
buffer the alienation that accompanies the freedom allowed in the city.  
Gadamer brings up Hegel’s argument that “making oneself at home in the world” is 
constitutive of humanity.  Humans have the desire “to be at home with oneself, secure from any 
threat of danger, surrounded by a familiar, understood and understandable world where one can 
feel free of anxiety” (Gadamer 1996, 154). What is beginning to develop is a conversation 
about the connection between health and feeling at home in the world. Gadamer whose main 
thesis holds health as fundamentally enigmatic, talks about how the meaning attached to health 
lies in an experience of balance and proportion (1996, 107). Illness on the other hand 
objectifies itself, and in Gadamer’s terms “forces itself on us” (1996,107). There is a 
connection between the desire to be at home with oneself in an understandable world and 
health, if we consider health as a sense of balance. The notion of being at home, like the notion 
of balance implies a settling in. Settling assumes a natural balance, as if everything moves to its 
right place. Our home allows us to be balanced, to feel secure and to experience the familiar. 
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An interruption to the familiarity of the home, like illness, objectifies itself, forces itself, 
confronts us with something other. The neighbour who blocks our hope of feeling at home in 
the world, a hope that we have for the neighbourhood as a home, can then be formulated as a 
health risk.  
This is the deep issue of the bad neighbour: They generate an anxiety that disrupts our 
need to feel at home. We can now start to understand what makes possible talk about the 
neighbour as a health risk. The implications of quotes A and B and the Mr. Splendore story 
seem to be that a good neighbourhood is good for health, that a good neighbour is good for the 
health of a neighbourhood. The neighbourhood becomes unhealthy in the presence of a bad 
neighbour, and a bad neighbour is one who makes your home strange. This recognition allows 
for a deeper interpretation of any material describing adverse effects of bad neighbours on 
health and its experience.  
Concerns about types of people are concerns about health. Each quote justifies these by 
citing evidence – survey responses in quote A, and medical results in quote B. Contained in 
both is the unrecognized and unintended implication that to live well means to live with others 
who are like us. The neighbour as a health risk retains a status as something near, albeit 
undesirably so. 
 Solutions begin to appear in the form of education or departure: The undesirable 
neighbour can be educated to fit in, rather than disturb the sense of being at home; they can be 
made less strange. The neighbours who see their health as at risk can be educated about their 
neighbour, this assumes an understanding that he is not so different will allow them to feel 
safer in his presence. One whose ability to feel at home in the neighbourhood can leave, or they 
can force the neighbour (health threat) to leave. As solutions, these all deserve due 
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consideration – which I am not able to get to in this paper, but which I will consider later in the 
larger body that this paper will make up. What is important at the moment is that the problem 
of the neighbour as a health risk (or conversely, as a benefit to health) formulates the neighbour 
in a very specific, and potentially dangerous way.  
 To recognize otherness (in the neighbour) as a health risk and act on it as a health 
problem means a depoliticization of the problem the Neighbour represents. Recalling the 
definition of the neighbour introduced earlier in this paper, to call someone a neighbour can 
reflect a political and ethical position. Part of the recognition of a neighbour is a recognition of 
our duty to the other – a recognition of their entitlement to kindness, compassion and 
consideration. This version of the neighbour is lost in talk that formulates only the risk they 
present to health.    
Hysteria and Hysterical Solutions to the Problem of the Neighbour 
If we return momentarily to the Mr. Splendore story and the complimentary articles on the bad 
neighbour presented with it, we can see a danger inherent in a relation with the problem 
neighbour. The Neighbour has a potentially hystericizing effect on us. What is interesting here 
is not the possible reactions to any neighbour, but why we react hysterically to the problem 
neighbour. When I use the word hysteria I am talking in a theoretical rather than medical sense 
though I use it to describe material that reflects Freud’s version of the hysterical symptom 
(1955). Hysteria in this study refers to any speech that contains an element of psychological 
stress that is converted in to a physical symptom. For example, in terms of a character like Mr. 
Splendor, we could call him a hysteric because of the sheer volatility of his anger in reaction to 
everyday (albeit annoying) activities of his neighbours. I acknowledge that there can be more 
than my interpretation of Mr. Splendore’s reaction. My use of him as an example of hysteria in 
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the face of the neighbour is not to objectively diagnose but to explore hysteria and its 
possibility as a phenomenon.  
 What we can learn from the Mr. Splendore case is that the hysterical reaction to the 
neighbour is brought about in an experience with helplessness, or as Bonner might say, an 
encounter with the limits of human action. The solution to the problem of the neighbour can be 
considered hysterical when it ignores the underlying problem, say our limits, and seeks to 
provide a solution to the symptom. In this case, Mr. Splendore’s deep problem is not that he 
doesn’t like his neighbours. His problem is the pain of an encounter with otherness. This is not 
a problem specific to Mr. Splendore, but a problem of collective life. His attempts to deal with 
his neighbours, can be seen as instances of treating the symptom rather than the real problem, 
the pain of living with others, and living with others is part of the human condition (Arendt 
1958). His final solution, moving, can be understood itself as a symptom of the deep problem 
of not knowing how to deal with otherness. Departure in response to the pain of an encounter 
with otherness does nothing to heal that pain, nor does it better equip the social actor to orient 
to otherness in a way that allows some element of coping with pain.  
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Chapter 3. Sharing, Health and the City 
In his article, Health and Life, Stanley Raffel builds on Arendt with the aim of showing how a 
positive attitude to the fact that to live is to have been given certain things in advance before we 
are able to decide if we want them: life, existence in a world of things and other people. For my 
purposes here, I will look at one of the three givens Raffel brings in from Arendt: before we 
can decide whether we want to share the world, we are faced with other people who have been 
here before us (Raffel 1985). Simply put, living in this world means sharing it with others. That 
they have been here before us alludes to an inequality in this sharing relationship, and Raffel 
discusses how such inequality brings out an urge to catch up. Yet he is critical of this urge, 
pointing out that the experience of someone or something being before us charactizes not only 
our relations with others, but our own life (we do not decide whether we want to be born), and 
therefore to orient to catching up is a futile and frustrating experience- we cannot engage in a 
competition with ourself (Raffel 1985). 
 He shows how the negative in the experience of sharing reveals itself if we see the 
world in terms of what we could have if others were not there first to use and use it up:  
Whoever we might be, other people do seem to have an advantage, a headstart over 
us. The most obvious way to express this undeniable fact of life is to point to the 
unequal distibution of material resources, whether physical attributes like strength 
or looks, natural abilities like talents or mental facilities, possessions such as money 
or other forms of wealth (1985, 154). 
 
Raffel argues that if we remove the instinctive (but unhealthy) urge to compete with others we 
are left with is a more positive interpretation of the condition that others are here before us:  
when we experience that other people have been there in advance, all our 
experience most basically means is not so much that other people have the edge on 
us as simply that there are other people or, to put it more positively, that we are not 
alone or, to put it even more positively, life offers a built-in cure for loneliness 




Raffel has taken the given of a shared world, and shown that it can be seen both negatively and 
positively, and urges the latter is truer to the condition. Why does he choose to be positive 
when the experience can be seen as instinctually negative?  And why does he choose something 
easily experienced as negative in order to talk about health, something that finds a home in the 
realm of the positive? It seems that what Raffel’s speech shows us, is that an orientation to 
health comes in light of something that can or does influence our life in a negative way- in this 
case that we share the world. It is because this sharing does not present itself as obviously a 
good thing that we can take what he calls “a healthy attitude” towards it, and actively think 
about health in relation to others. In talking about our relations with others, Raffel is showing 
us a picture of and an argument for what it means to be healthy (the capacity to develop a 
positive attitude toward what we are given), and his talk suggests that being healthy requires 
something more negative given to us first: a threat.  The threat makes the active healthy 
orientation possible. This can be illustrated if we think about the absurdity of working out a 
healthy attitude to something instinctively positive. You will not find many self-help books on 
how to cope healthily with something as enjoyable as a good nights sleep. 
 So, Raffel’s discussion of Arendt shows us that part of life is that we have to share, but 
we can be optimistic about this. We “do not have to be lonely here,” (1985, 155) because of the 
existence of others. But if, according to Raffel, it is in our very nature to compete with others, 
how do we reject that? Raffel says that this realization can happen “if we free ourselves from 
any instinctive competitive urges with regard to others,” (1985, 155) but, again, if our instincts 
are part of who we are, how can we become free from them? These questions reveal that while 
optimism, in its orientation to what is best, is close to health, the work of optimism in its purest 
28 
 
form hides the negativity and frustration that allows it to develop in the first place. While 
Raffel correctly shows us that an orientation to what is positive “has at least the glimmer of an 
interest in health since health involves maintaining a thing at its best,” (1985, 155) his talk 
should and does not lead to the conclusion that being an optimist is equivalent to being healthy. 
After all, what kind of version of health is that which is only oriented to seeing the bright side 
of a bad situation? 
 Raffel calls on us to remember that while the fact that others were here first is 
experienced as limiting, the fact that others are here, is at its base a positive thing because it 
provides “a built in cure for loneliness”. This brings up the question of how we can even know 
loneliness when one of the conditions for existing is that we are never alone? While sharing the 
world with others has hardly been able to prevent the existence of loneliness, there is something 
to love about others, in that their existence holds a key to a cure.  
 The paradox that we need to be with others who at the same time force us to experience 
limits has been taken up in several writings by Slavok !i"ek. If we can thank Raffel for 
showing what it looks like to develop a positive outlook on having to share the world with 
others, we can thank !i"ek and his discussion of the neighbour for animating the negative. In 
other words, Raffel gives us what might be understood as some incentive to love our 
neighbours, but !i"ek reminds us how close to impossible this can often be. This is clearly an 
argument in his discussion of the Ten Commandments in his book The Fragile Absolute: 
... when the Old Testament enjoins you to love and respect your neighbour, this 
refers not to your imaginary sembable/double, but to the neighbour qua traumatic 
Thing. In contrast to the New Age image which ultimately reduces my 
Other/Neighbour to my mirror-image, or to a step along the path of my own self-
realization (like Jungian psychology in which others around me are ultimately 
reduced to externalizations/projections of the different disavowed aspects of my 
own personality), Judaism opens up a tradition in which an alien traumatic kernel 
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forever persists in my Neighbour – the Neighbour remains an inert, impenetrable, 
enigmatic presence that hystericizes me (2000, 109 ) 
 
Others, or in !i"ek’s terms, neighbours bring with them a kernel of healing- the promise that 
we “do not have to be lonely”, according to Raffel.  But according to !i"ek, the concept of the 
Neighbour, in the Judaeo-Christian sense refers to something at its core so other to oneself that 
its very presence brings out hysteria.   
 By speaking of loneliness as having a cure, Raffel shows how the suffering attached to 
being alone is akin to illness. This illness has a built in cure: other people. But seeing others for 
what they are- as other to us, rather than projections of oneself- comes with its own set of 
problems, with their own potential to throw off the balance of health. To suggest !i"ek’s 
version of the Neighbour as an enigmatic, impenetrable, traumatic “Thing” can be a cure for 
loneliness seems, at first, to make as much sense as reminding child who is afraid of being 
alone in the dark that she at least has some monsters under her bed to keep her company. ...The 
problem of the Neighbour is actually a problem with difference – a difference that is 
fundamental rather than subjective, and therefore cannot be escaped no matter how much you 
learn about each other or how much you get along. 
 It is also useful to remember that loneliness is not reserved for people who are 
physically alone in the world. In fact, it often comes out of the experience of being different. 
Thus, if the Neighbour reminds us of our fundamental differences, then the understanding that 
we share the world is a simultaneous realization that we are also very much alone in it if we so 
much as try to understand those others we share it with. It is in this realization that we can see 
the Neighbour emerge as a risk to health, if being healthy is defined by ones ability to be 
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forgetful, because the Neighbour reminds us of our limits and threatens our experience of 
freedom in the world.  
 In fact, following Freud and Lacan, !i"ek argues that the order to “love thy neighbour” 
in the old testament is problematic not because people will always have differences amongst 
each other (i.e. different perspectives that colour one’s view and govern one’s values making 
love for someone else difficult) but because the Neighbour resists any universal dimension 
(2008, 56). It is in a relationship with the neighbour that we experience the gap between what is 
known and the unfathomable and irresolute unknown (2008, 56).  In resisting the universal, the 
Neighbour makes possible the recognition of loneliness instead of providing us with its cure. 
This is deeply the health risk contained in the problem of the Neighbour: Her enigma, her 
otherness, is a terrifying and stressful reminder that we are alone in a world that we will never 
truly be able to understand or feel at home in. This allows for another formulation of the 
neighbour in relation to anxiety. Specific anxieties about ones neighbours seem to reflect a 
general anxiety suffered in the disturbance of a knowable world.  
 On one hand we have the fact that there are neighbours as holding a cure for loneliness, 
on the other hand the Neighbour contains an experience of the gap between what is known and 
the unknowable, which manifests itself as anxiety.  The cliché “you can’t live with ‘em, can’t 
live without ‘em” is a tempting conclusion. But to end there would be to give up on health 
altogether. Taken seriously, the cliché suggests that we are in a position that makes living- let 
alone living well- pretty much impossible. The reality is that we do live with neighbours and 
that we cannot choose to live without them. The question that considers the dimension of health 
becomes one of how do we live well with others, in spite of the anxiety we’re faced with in any 
encounter with the Other.  
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 Freud’s answer to the question of how one is able to heal an illness connected to ones 
circumstance in life that cannot be altered is relevant here:  
You will be able to convince yourself that much will be gained if we succeed in 
transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life 
that is restored to health you will be better armed against that unhappiness (Freud & 
Breuer 1978, 393).  
 
Note that Freud’s version of healing does not exclude a notion of pain, and in fact, pain itself 
(the true pain, rather than the false pain expressed in the symptom) is needed for health in a 
way that goes beyond allowing a definition of health through what it is not. Contained in this 
answer is a version of healing that comes from a transformation. The concerns in quote A about 
the anxiety caused by a “bad” neighbour can be transformed to reflect the universal anxiety in 
the face of a world whose incomprehensibility reveals itself in our experience of sharing it with 
others.  The belief that renters and street people are bad for one’s health can be transformed 
into a problem of not knowing how to deal with the anxiety brought on in the face of otherness. 
Such a transformation would resist solutions or cures designed to mask or get rid of diversity in 
a neighbourhood. To be at home in a neighbourhood requires being at home in a world of more 
than just things – a world of other people. The problem becomes one of how we are to orient to 
health in world that allows anxiety to thrive. Or, how do we live well and make ourselves at 
home in a world, that, in being shared with the Neighbour, has given anxiety a home as well? 
 The question of living well demands a return to the positive and asks us to embrace 
optimism again. There must be the possibility for a good life in spite of the anxiety we are 
faced with in the revelation of a Grey Zone. The Neighbour as incompatible with the universal 
is a recognition that allows us to experience something real about the dimension of the 
universal. Raffel’s idea of others as a cure for loneliness is revealed to stand up even in the face 
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of the unavoidable anxiety !i"ek’s talk animates. His statement “we do not have to be lonely 
here” implies a freedom despite our position in a world that we did not choose to share. Quite 
basically, the freedom in that recognition comes from embracing the positive of what we are 
given. Raffel demonstrates successfully that this can and should be done by someone who “has 




Chapter 4. The Bad Neighbour as a Symptom of City Life: The Case of 
Methadone 
The previous chapters came to the conclusion that talk about a problem neighbour points 
deeply to the problem of anxiety in the face of the unknown. Such anxiety, brought out in the 
recognition of the futility in understanding one’s neighbour, can generate hysterical attempts at 
a cure. I have suggested that such attempts are also symptomatic of the deep problem of the 
appearance of the Grey Zone, which itself is unavoidable. What is called for, then, is a healing 
relation to the problem of anxiety in the face of the unknown, rather than one that requires its 
elimination. The city, as a place for diversity and freedom makes an orientation to healing and 
coming to terms with anxiety appear as necessary and good for the actor with any kind of 
interest in living well in the city. Through an analysis of writings concerned with the city as a 
particular kind of home, this chapter explores the challenges and possibilities for coming to 
terms with anxiety in a place that offers no protection from it. While the city confronts us with 
multiple opportunities to fulfill multiple desires, the desire to experience a knowable world has 
no obvious solution here. I look at the tension between the opportunity for freedom in the city 
and the desire for a knowable world in terms of the challenge it presents to any actor committed 
to the value of both. I look at methadone treatment programs, enterprises often protested for 
being bad neighbours, as a case that illuminates these problems for city dwellers.  
Methadone and Health in the City 
Methadone management treatment (MMT), is supposed to offer a definitive solution to the 
problem of addiction in the city. Often times, however, the clinic’s location is a bone of 
contention for urban homeowners living near such an enterprise. Methadone clinics, their 
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clients, and staff are often formulated by urban homeowners as a threat to the safety and quality 
of their neighbourhood. This moves beyond mere dislike for the drug culture that might arrive 
in the neighbourhood with the opening of the clinic, to an accusation of irresponsibility and 
disrespect for the community on the part of clinic owners. 
The recognition of risk that the methadone clinic brings out in residents stimulates a 
conversation about the health and illness of cities and health and illness in general. As a stigma 
on the neighbourhood the methadone clinic takes on the appearance of something foreign and 
unwanted which imposes itself and disrupts the balance of health that was once experienced.  
And yet the clinic is in the business of restoring the health of addicts, and solving the social 
problem of addiction for the city.  
The paradox that a clinic can be both a health provider and disruptor brings up the 
question of the health of methadone (and the methadone clinic as a neighbour) in relation to 
city life. According to some urban homeowners who live near such clinics, methadone is 
unhealthy for their community and it exposes their children to health risks such as needles and 
violence and an increase in crime. This was certainly true for the homeowners I spoke with. But 
studies on methadone programs have shown them to reduce violence, crime and heroin use in 
general (Lind et al. 2004). Methadone is often formulated as a “healthier” alternative to heroin 
and other opiates (Fraser and Valentine 2008). The question becomes one of understanding 
what deep fears and anxiety is brought out in living near a “bad neighbour” such as a 
methadone clinic, and how such fears are part of an urban way of life.  
The tension between homeowners and advocates of methadone programs is embedded 
in certain understandings of the possibilities for health in the city, as well as what health means 
in the context of the city. The question of the (un)healthiness of methadone for both users and 
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the community demonstrates certain understandings of the relation between the healthy city and 
the healthy citizen. This becomes an issue in talk about the clinic, as well as in talk about the 
dangers of taking a “Not In My Backyard” orientation to the city. The question of the health of 
the city becomes inextricable from that of the health of its citizens, and the methadone debate 
becomes a debate about how one should live in the city. Such a debate requires a consideration 
of the place of anxiety in the city.  
A Bad Neighbour in Methadone 
I conducted a few short conversational interviews with residents living near a 
methadone clinic. Parts of these interviews are used in my analysis below, along with material 
from newspapers and the internet on instances of neighbourly disputes involving methadone 
programs. I should reiterate here that my use of interviews and other materials is not empirical. 
I use talk that I feel best exemplifies the problem of anxiety and the Grey Zone in the face of a 
“bad neighbour” in the city. It is not my argument that methadone programs necessarily 
damage neighbourhoods, nor is it my argument that they help them. The fact that they are 
understood as a threat to the neighbourhood is used as an opening to a conversation about the 
issues dealt with in earlier chapters.  
The following are quotes from community meeting minutes regarding the “necessary 
relocation” of a methadone clinic, which were read to me in interviews with residents living 
near the clinic.  
Almost all of the homes in this neighbourhood are owner occupied, several of which 
are the homes of families, with young children who have chosen this neighbourhood 
for its urban qualities and strong sense of community. [The Methadone Clinic] has 
brought a culture to our neighbourhood that did not previously exist: drug use, drug 
transactions, solicitation, trespassing, speeding and illegal parking, harassment and a 
reactionary police presence… There is a stigma attached to our neighbourhood 




We are worried and stressed every day about what we will see, hear, or be subjected 
to. We are worried about the environment that our children are being exposed to.  
 
The operation of the methadone clinic is directly impacting he safety and quality of 
our neighbourhood. It has created risk to personal safety and property values.  
 
What comes out in these quotes is the fear and anxiety that is suffered in the face of the 
Neighbour. While they are referring to a business rather than a single person, these statements 
seem to echo some of the issues expressed in earlier “bad neighbour” material from other 
chapters. Namely, the health and stress issues that seem to accompany an experiencing of not 
knowing what to expect from someone with whom you share a living space. Note that the 
anxiety here is comes from the experience of not knowing. What these quotes reflect, at a 
surface level, is the problem of anxiety in relation to the unknown. In this case, the unknown is 
embodied by the methadone subject, the drug addict, who is formulated as an unruly, 
unpredictable, criminal type. Whether this is true for any, some or all methadone clients is, for 
this chapter, inconsequential. It is the formulation itself that is interesting in that it reflects a 
fear that one could have of any neighbour. The phenomena which interests me here is the 
anxiety, rather than the credibility of the opinions of those who are anxious.  
Urban Qualities 
The first quote seems to reflect a notion of urban qualities as quantifiable features that 
can exist or not exist in any given neighbourhood regardless of its location or size. Urban 
qualities appear as certain measurable features of city life, and they can be taken into 
consideration in buying a home. The quote describes a notion of a place to live chosen in terms 
of the qualities it offers the individual. It brings up an image of someone in the act of shopping 
for a place to buy a home, and checking off items on a list (Nearby dog park, check; bus rout, 
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check; grocery store and restaurants in walking distance, check.) Seeing urban qualities in this 
way does not contradict the possibility for experiencing a “strong sense of community” in the 
city, because urban and rural qualities are removed from place and treated as items that may or 
may not be in a space.  
 In this light, the mere act of buying a home is exercised by imagining the kinds of 
things one wants and does not want in her backyard. The implication is that one is always a 
kind of NIMBY. Urban qualities as measurable characteristics creates the possibility of a place 
that includes certain features of the urban and of the rural while excluding others. Thus the 
choice to live in the city does not have to mean that one accepts all of the perils thought once to 
be part and parcel of city life. 
NIMBY as the (ir?)Responsible Citizen  
 We can see NIMBY both as an insult to someone’s way of being a citizen and as a 
version of responsible citizenship if we see it as representing a good or bad choice of what 
should be in a backyard. NIMBY as an insult implies that the individual wants a certain quality 
out of her backyard because of a misguided notion of what should be in one’s backyard. 
Advocates of harm reduction reflect this position. To them the good city should be inclusive 
and accepting, thus to exclude an addict from the picture of the neighbourhood is to be a bad 
city dweller. NIMBY as a version of civic responsibility reflects a different preference, in the 
case of the methadone clinic, a preference not to have drug addicts around a residential 
neighbourhood, and yet it seems to answer the same question as the NIMBY insult answers: 
What should we want in our backyard? A concern with property values, children’s safety, or 




The NIMBY expression doesn’t have to be treated as something that needs to be solved. 
As Blum (2003) puts it: “We must sacrifice the temptation to treat the cliché as a matter which 
we must decide factually or argumentatively in order to treat it as the surface of an implicit 
discourse in relation to a problem which remains to be explored” (Blum 2003, 193).  The 
remainder of this paper attempts to uncover and develop the problem embedded in the NIMBY 
discourse through a discussion of commitment to place and living with difference in the city.  
The idea of urban qualities as measurable characteristics or indicators stands in contrast 
to the idea of the quality (excellence) of urban life. We can examine this through looking at 
theorists who see place in terms of its ability to foster a particular way of being in the world. 
Raffel (2006) develops the idea of the actor who is attached to a place “because they see the 
place as offering the potential to practice a principle” (105).  To apply this notion to the quality 
of the urban, is to see its status as a place where certain values are made possible through the 
kind of life it allows.  
If we recall Simmel’s claim that city “assures the individual a type and degree of 
personal freedom to which there is no analogy in other circumstances”(1971, 332), the city now 
appears not only as a space to live with certain advantages and disadvantages, but as the place 
that enables those committed to personal freedom to live in a way that demonstrates this 
commitment.  
If place is vital to the exercise of certain principles, and a commitment to a principle is 
enabled through a commitment to a type of place, the NIMBY complaint above can be moved 
out of the realm of deciding whether the rejection of a methadone program in one’s 
neighbourhood is an example of proper or improper city living. At first appearing as a 
39 
 
description of a culture clash between the middle class homeowners and the methadone clients, 
the real tension is in the commitment to, and practice of, two seemingly conflicting principles. 
The concept of urban quality does not exclude a methadone culture. As Simmel points 
out, the freedom that is the condition of city life is not necessarily an emotionally pleasant 
experience (1971, 334).  Freedom in the metropolis comes at the price of loneliness, alienation 
and even the experience of danger. To leave the city (or demand that someone else leaves the 
city) because of an unpleasant subjective experience would be to abandon the principle of 
freedom that made the city desirable in the first place. To ignore the danger that a methadone 
culture presents to children and family life appears as irresponsible parenting. The problem 
becomes one of practicing what one preaches. How does one show one’s commitment to the 
city as a site of personal freedom, while also preserving a commitment to the sense of 
community demanded by family life? 
Simmel proposes that the unique phenomenon of the ancient polis must be attributed to 
the collision of individuality with the narrow characteristic of small town life: “The tremendous 
agitation and excitement, and the unique colorfulness of Athenian life is perhaps explained by 
the fact that people of incomparably individualized personalities were in constant struggle 
against the incessant inner and external oppression of a de-individualizing small town” (1971, 
333). Bonner takes this up and suggests that, “the interest of modern consciousness 
(“questioning limits and engaging otherness”) has the possibility of developing a positive 
relation to its limits where unregulated individuality is resisted by a sense of community and, in 
like manner, the oppressiveness of a de-individualizing community is resisted by the desire to 
make room for individual uniqueness” (1997, 29).  It is the very tension between community 
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and individual freedom that contains the possibility for the development of a unique place for 
political action.  
This still does not seem to solve the problem pointed to in the NIMBY talk presented at 
the beginning of the paper, but it does allow us to imagine another kind of place that allows a 
commitment to a new principle that transcends mere individual freedom or sense of 
community, and yet doesn’t exclude them.  
Returning to Raffel’s talk about attachment to place, we can imagine NIMBY as strong 
political action not in terms of what motivates it, but in terms of its capacity to remind us of 
something particular:  “It is certainly possible for ‘the very repute of the place where we live’ 
(McHugh, 2005:149) to be called into question and that would be when it is failing to be even 
close to exemplifying its own supposed principles. Those particular enough to want to remind it 
of what it is supposed to be should not be accused of not being sufficiently committed to it” 
(2006, 105).  
The expression of conflict between freedom and community referenced in NIMBY talk 
demands a serious consideration of the meaning and relative importance of the values one is 
committed to. This consideration, to be serious, would have to include a notion of what is 
worth fighting for (having or not having) in one’s backyard—not in terms of some idea of 
comfort or personal preference—but in terms of a commitment to a quality of place that 
enables quality action.  
The City 
If the neighbourhood was chosen for its “urban qualities” we must ask after the meaning 
of the urban. To do this, I look at how different theorists conceptualize urbanity. From Marx, 
who saw urbanization as rescuing people from idiocy, and saw also the revolutionary character 
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of urbanity to Wirth who attempted to empirically define the city and demonstrate the effect of 
urbanism on human behaviour. I will then move to a discussion of the idea that the city is 
nothing but a sign, which can be understood as either a beginning or an end of inquiry, and the 
implications of understanding it in both of these ways. I bring in material on a particular “bad 
neighbour” – a methadone treatment centre as an occasion to further develop a narrative that is  
concerned with the problem of feeling at home in the city 
Marx: The Revolutionary Character of Urbanity 
The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created 
enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the 
rural and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of 
rural life (Marx 1978, 477).  
 
The socialistic bourgeoisie want all the advantages of modern social conditions 
struggles and dangers necessarily resulting therefrom. They desire the existing state 
of society minus its revolutionary and disintegrating elements (Marx 1978, 496). 
 
Marx’s writings are grounded in an understanding of the superiority of the city as a site 
of development and civilization. Danger is present in both the rural and urban, though it takes 
on qualitatively different forms in each type of society. The danger of the rural is the danger of 
idiocy, of not living up to one’s potential as a human being. The city allows for this potential to 
be reached, but it presents a danger as well. The physical danger of the city, and the bad 
neighbour in the city can be formulated as products of the city’s revolutionary character. Marx 
argues that both are worth suffering. Not only is city life worth suffering, but, suffering the 
struggles and dangers of the city is a fate which must be suffered. The bad neighbour as such a 
struggle of city life becomes something that, according to Marx, must be encountered by an 
actor who leaves behind “rural idiocy” for the freedom the urban way of life allows.  
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According to Marx, the modern city exists because of the revolutionary character of the 
bourgeoisie. The cities that the bourgeoisie are responsible for creating, however, now present 
the greatest danger to the bourgeois class. Once rescued from rurality, the proletariat is able to 
know for the first time, that he is being oppressed. For Marx, this recognition was required for 
the proletariat class to overthrow the bourgeoisie.  
Marx’s criticism of the socialistic bourgeoisie can be understood as one answer to the 
question of health in the city. His writings point to the phenomenon of needing something, in 
this case, modern social conditions and feeling threatened by what is characteristic of the very 
conditions one need. The socialistic bourgeoisie desire the advantages of the city and yet the 
“struggles and dangers” which, according to Marx are a necessary result of modern social 
conditions, are something the socialistic bourgeois does not want at all.  
What is the relation between the problem of the neighbour as a health risk in relation to 
feeling at home in the world and Marx’s version of progress? For Marx, it seems like health 
(one of the “advantages of modern social conditions”) and progress are inextricable, and yet 
progress and danger (revolution) are also inextricable. Bringing the conversation back to the 
case of the neighbour, the tension is made visible in the understanding that the neighbourhood 
offers a solution to a problem of alienation, and yet the sense of closeness with neighbours that 
it allows causes an inability to ever feel at home. The bad neighbour as a risk to health points to 
an understanding of danger, but is this a revolutionary danger in the sense that Marx was 
alluding to?  
Using Marx’s lens to understand neighbourly relations in the city, we can see the 
neighbours as demonstrating an orientation to the city in which they desire the freedom and 
opportunity the city gives them (urban qualities) and yet feel threatened by the danger of city 
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life (manifest in the otherness of the neighbour). According to Marx, the revolutionary 
character of the city, which endangers the bourgeoisie, is a danger that they brought on 
themselves and therefore deserve. If danger, in the form of a revolutionary character, is 
necessary for the city to exist, then it becomes impossible to see conflict as a sign of bad health.  
How then is it possible to understand the bad neighbour as a health risk to other residents in the 
neighbourhood.  
Another interesting query that emerges from a consideration of Marx’s writings about 
the city is that of the idea of the relation between progress and revitalization. Applied to a bad 
neighbour in the form of say, a methadone clinic, we have a “revitalized” neighbourhood being 
a product of a bourgeois orientation to the city, which is actually threatened by a “progressive” 
form of addiction treatment. 
The conflict between the bourgeoisie and proletariat that is foundational to Marx’s 
argument can be read as one attempt to account for the problem of the neighbour in the city. In 
Marx’s case, the dimension of the Neighbour as Other is exemplified in the oppression of the 
bourgeoisie and the potential for a violent revolt of the proletariat.  Implied not so subtly in 
Marx’s writings is the argument that the two classes cannot exist without violence or 
oppression.  
Wirth: Urbanism as a Way of Life 
The distinctive features of the urban mode of life have often been described 
sociologically as consisting of the substitution of secondary for primary contacts, 
weakening bonds of kinship, and the declining social significance of the family, the 
disappearance of the neighbourhood, and the undermining of the traditional basis of 
social solidarity (Wirth 1938, 157).  
 
Wirth’s interest in defining the city is grounded in certain understandings of what a 
proper definition should look like.  His definition of the city is structured by the idea of 
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measurement, which is grounded in the notion of an objective and verifiable world. Wirth 
offers a version of a measurable and measurably different city. The city’s set of distinctive 
features, including weak social bonds, and a decline of the family and neighbourhood are 
precisely attributable to the city because of their ability to be shown empirically to relate to an 
urban setting.  
 Wirth’s definition of the city also needs to be read in terms of its implicit 
recommendation of what living in the city should look like: “Overwhelmingly the city dweller 
is not a home owner, and since a transitory habitat does not generate binding traditions and 
sentiments, only rarely is he a true neighbor” (Wirth 1938, 157).  If observable trends define 
the city, and these trends include a weakening of social bonds and a disappearance of 
traditional notions of family, the city-dweller should reflect these characteristics. Thus it is 
possible to be a good city dweller and a terrible neighbour. Further, one’s being a bad 
neighbour is not something for which they can be faulted, rather it is caused by the social 
conditions of city life. 
 The oft-cited criticism of those who oppose MMT and other forms of drug treatment 
aimed at reducing the harms of drugs, rather than punishing addicts, is that the one who stands 
against harm reducing strategies does so with a concern for themselves rather than a concern 
for the good of society. The term NIMBY (acronym for Not In My Backyard) reflects an idea 
of what counts as good and bad advocacy, with bad advocacy coming from a selfish place with 
a blindness to the whole.  
 What should be examined is the relation to the city and health exemplified by the 
NIMBY actor. Like Wirth’s version of the good city dweller who can also be a bad neighbour, 
we have a version of a bad city dweller (in that they don’t recognize the importance of the city 
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as a whole) who can also be accused of being a bad neighbour, and yet their action (in this case 
to remove the clinic) seems to be driven by a concern for neighbourliness and a healthy city.  
The quotes introduced at the beginning of this chapter describe a neighbourhood with 
urban qualities and a strong sense of community. In the following sentence, a new culture 
involving “drug use, drug transactions, solicitation, trespassing, speeding and illegal parking, 
harassment and a reactionary police presence,” is described as becoming a part of the 
neighbourhood since the opening of the methadone clinic.  That these activities (drug use, 
trespassing, etc.), are understood by the neighbours as part of a “new culture,” rather than 
additional “urban qualities” shows an understanding of city life that does not regard social 
disorganization as part of the urban.  The experience of city life, which comes through in the 
quote from the community meeting seems to contradict the experience of city life as described 
by Wirth. We are left with the problem of the city as representing a variety of meanings. It is 
this problem that the following section of the paper attempts to engage with.  
Pahl: The End of Inquiry to the City as a Cure for Uncertainty 
 Taking in to account Marx and Wirth’s understandings of the city has created confusion 
in reading the quote about the methadone clinic. It seems that the neighbours are in a situation 
of wanting what they can never have, much like Marx’s socialistic bourgeoisie who wants the 
benefits of city life without the revolutionary character, and is therefore as much of an idiot as 
the ruralite. Similarly, using Wirth’s lens, these neighbours look like they simply do not 
understand what the urban way of life is. Their concern with ownership, community and family 
is out of place in Wirth’s sociological definition of urbanity. And yet Wirth’s understanding of 
urbanity as a force that caused certain behaviours (e.g. transience) in social actors would not 
stand up to an empirical test if one were to be conducted in this neighbourhood. Clearly, the 
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force of urbanity in the particular case of this neighbourhood did not cause a decrease in home 
ownership, or a devaluation of family life. Perhaps, rather than being too idiotic to realize what 
city life requires of them, the neighbours simply refuse to let the notion of social 
disorganization rule their understanding of the city. Perhaps this is in part how they are able to 
understand the neighbourhood as stigmatized by the clinic.  
 Ray Pahl (1969) championed the idea that the physical characteristics of urbanity (size, 
density, heterogeneity) hold no significance in predicting the behaviour of individuals:  
The essence of the city, to the true urbanite, is choice. The true citizen is the one 
who can and does exercise choice.... 
 
For sections of the middle class, choice is a way of life – in everything from 
consumer goods to the friends and kin they want to keep up with and the place in 
which they live. Thus we have some people who are in the city but not of it... (Pahl 
1969, 273) 
 
 Pahl’s version of the urbanite as one for whom choice is a way of life appears to more 
closely represent the speaker formulated in the quote about the methadone clinic. Like the actor 
formulated in Pahl, the neighbours orient to the place they live as a choice they made based on 
personal preference (i.e. the neighbours have “chosen the neighbourhood for its urban qualities 
and strong sense of community”). Does this orientation allow the idea of NIMBY to seem like 
a version of responsible citizenship? In accepting personalized idea of the city, Pahl decides to 
get rid of the urban-rural distinction all together. If a rural-like atmosphere (e.g. strong sense of 
community) is attainable in the city, and an urban mindset can find a home in the countryside, 
place seems to make no difference. This is what he means when he asserts, “in a sociological 
context, the terms rural and urban are more remarkable for their ability to confuse than for their 
power to illuminate” (Pahl 1969, 263). In other words, the city is a sort of grey area, a symbol 
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rather than a fact. The city therefore is characteristically confusing. It represents something that 




“The City is Nothing But a Sign” 
 The unknowable character of the city prompts Pahl (and many contemporary 
sociologists, for that matter) to simply avoid the task of understanding the city altogether. This 
avoidance is grounded in the assumption that what is worth studying is that which is verifiable, 
and that which is fundamentally unknowable does not belong in the discipline of sociology. 
Thus they have “solved” the problem of the unknowable city by concluding that the city is 
therefore nothing.  
 Alan Blum turns the understanding that the city is nothing on its head in The 
Imaginative Structure of the City: 
The recommendation that the city is nothing but a sign serves us as a research 
provocation for beginning to make transparent the imaginative structure of place.... 
Even indeterminacy (if it exists) must be engaged and encountered as the social 
form that it is from a place that is ruled by the sovereignty of questioning. That the 
object takes on flesh in its very discourse (say, the object of indeterminacy) means 
that the discourse is joined to the space of this (interpretive) territory which marks 
its boundaries (Blum 2003, 28).  
 
 The discussion on Pahl demonstrated the possibility of understanding “the city is 
nothing but a sign” as an end of inquiry as structured by assumptions of verification, a 
knowable world and the superiority of empirical knowledge. Obviously, Blum’s treatment of 
the idea as a “research provocation” demonstrates fundamentally different assumptions about 
what it means to do theory than Pahl. Blum’s work is grounded in the value in engaging 
indeterminacy, which is grounded in a vision of a world which comes to be only through such 
action. Whereas Pahl’s speech comes from a place ruled by the desire for certainty, Blum 
proposes an inquiry “ruled by the sovereignty of questioning.”  
The recognition of these two opposing understandings of social inquiry brings forth the 
question: What is the relative worth of these two orientations to the cliché “the city is nothing 
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but a sign”? In other words, what is the strongest way to orient to something strange, or 
unknown? Before delving in to a conversation about the meaning of good inquiry, let us return 
temporarily to our case of the neighbourhood and the methadone clinic, and to the question: 
How does the clinic become knowable as a stigma on the neighbourhood? 
Thus far, an exploration of Marx and Wirth has formulated a city, which would not 
necessarily be stigmatized by the goings on at the methadone clinic. A discussion of Pahl on 
the other hand points to a version of the city structured by a commitment to freedom and choice 
in place to live. Pahl pointed out that “choice as a way of life” was an option only for the 
bourgeoisie, who had the means to be mobile (1969).  Thus to understand how the neighbours 
can know the methadone clinic as a stigma, requires an understanding of the self understanding 
and desire of the bourgeois actor, and the relation of each to the concept of stigma.  
The Bourgeoisie and the City 
 In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber attributes the rise and 
dominance of the modern capitalistic enterprise to the particularities of the Protestant 
bourgeoisie (Weber 2007, 7; Blum 2003). Weber’s thesis is that capitalism is thriving because 
of a particular response to the problem of an uncertain afterlife grounded in the assumption of 
predestination. The bourgeois solution to the problem of uncertainty was to seek assurance of 
God’s grace, in the form of wealth. Thus, while one could never know for sure that she would 
be saved, and while there was no way to change one’s fate as saved or damned, the bourgeois 
actor was able to look for hints regarding her destiny in her economic circumstance (Weber 




 Bonner (1998) looks at the “inversion of the relationship between action and 
confidence,” a particular innovation of the bourgeois perspective, in relation to the problem of 
modern parenting.  Bonner developed the modern parental actor as one who was faced with the 
problem needing to experience power (potency) in the context of uncertainty.  The bourgeois 
solution was to act to secure the means to gain confidence with regard to the future, a solution 
which, according to Bonner (86), “connotes both a responsibility to and a concern with what is 
one’s own.”  
 How does the notion of a responsibility to and concern with what is one’s own shed 
light on the problem of neighbourliness in the city? In the very first sentence of the quote from 
the community meetings, it is stated that the homes in the neighbourhood are owner-occupied. 
In the last sentence, the stigma on the neighbourhood is said to affect “children, residents and 
property values.” What does it mean to be stigmatized and how can the methadone clinic be 
understood as a stigma to the neighbourhood. The concept of stigma is grounded in an 
understanding of the obviously disgraceful.  Stigma is associated with the notion of being 
marked, identified, and labeled as undesirable in some way. To experience stigma implies an 
experience of being known by others as undesirable or unclean. The stigma imposes itself on 
the object or individual. While beginning as some outside phenomenon, the stigma attaches 
itself to the object or individual, and in so doing, becomes the characteristic of that object or 
individual. 
 If the self-conception of the bourgeois is structured by a desire to show one’s 
desirability, and this desirability is visible in the quality (economic value) of one’s property, we 
can begin to see how the methadone clinic becomes knowable as a stigma on the 
neighbourhood, and consequently on the people who live there.  When reality is understood in 
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light of a bourgeois desire for certainty, the interruption of the neighbourhood’s status as a 
comfortable place makes it less desirable for the bourgeois actor.  
 To understand the methadone clinic as a stigma on the community, and consequently on 
the residents, children and property values, is grounded in assumptions of mobility and choice 
in place to live (the city is but one option among many in terms of a place to raise kids), as well 
as an assumption of ones self worth reflected in the monetary value of what one owns. Home 
ownership near the methadone clinic in this light looks both financially and physically unwise. 
Why would the bourgeois version of a rational, intelligent parent choose to live in a place 
where her children and investments were not safe? Parents who chose the neighbourhood to 
raise children are made to look irresponsible for exposing their children to the problem of 
addiction, or they are considered financially unable to move anywhere else. In the bourgeois 
paradigm, both are signs of disgrace. While the neighbours remember choosing the 
neighbourhood for its strong sense of community, and the choice and convenience that being in 
the city allowed them, the clinic’s arrival along with the urban characteristics accompanying it 
seems monstrous. They got something that they didn’t bargain for. This recognition itself is one 




Chapter 5. The Proverbial Fence: Boundaries and Discretion as Solutions to 
the Problem of the Neighbour 
 
A problem that has been articulated thus far is the question of how we are to orient to health in 
a world that allows anxiety to thrive. In other words, since our world is a shared world, and it is 
shared with the Neighbour who reminds us of the fundamental gap between the unknown and 
the known and in so doing prevents us from feeling at home, how then, do we experience 
something knowable and comfortable in the city? There are everyday projects that reflect an 
interest in such a need to feel at home in the city, amongst diversity that can at times seem 
intolerable and terrifying. Earlier, I suggested that the concept of the neighbourhood in the city 
serves as one way in which we might feel at home in a place that would otherwise be 
unknowable and never familiar. The neighbourhood acts like a village in the monstrous city, it 
sorts people, provides a boundary. It limits the effects of diversity in our private life.  
 In this chapter I look at solutions to the problem of the neighbour in the city through an 
analysis of the proverb “good fences make good neighbours.” I resist treating the saying as one 
that needs to be proven or disproven. That is to say, I am not interested in discovering the ways 
in which a fence might help or hinder ones relationship with his or her neighbour. Rather, 
following Blum (2003, 193) I treat the saying as “the surface of an implicit discourse in relation 
to a problem which remains to be explored.” In other words “good fences make good 
neighbours” references a conversation about the relation of boundaries to neighbourliness, and 
offers an answer to the question of what a good neighbour is.  
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Kenneth Burke: Proverbs as Medicine 
In his short essay Literature as Equipment for Living (1973), Kenneth Burke exemplified his 
method of sociological interpretation through an analysis of proverbs. What he sought to 
demonstrate was that sociological criticism could be applied with both accuracy and rigor to 
material that was not necessarily sociological in nature.  
Burke’s question in analyzing proverbs is what kind of action a particular saying is 
recommending. Proverbs imply a command to act in a certain way in the face of a certain 
situation. As Burke puts it: “Everything is medicine” (1973, 293). Thus, language is formed 
through typical and recurrent social situations, and it always implies a recommended way to 
act. Proverbs, according to Burke, are an accessible and obvious example of this. He describes 
them as strategies or possibly attitudes. Thus, proverbs are not at all neutral. They reference an 
implicit set rules and a moral stance on a common issue or situation that requires social action.  
He uses the example of the many words for snow in the Eskimo language, each which 
suggests a different way of acting. He argues that so many words are needed because of how 
variations of snow affect day-to-day living. He uses this discussion to support his argument that 
proverbs imply a corresponding action: 
Hence, they must “size up” snow much more accurately than we do. And the same 
is true of social phenomena. Social structures give rise to “type” situations, subtle 
subdivisions of the relationships involved in competitive and cooperative acts. 
Many proverbs seek to chart, in more or less homey and picturesque ways, these 
“type” situations. I submit that such naming is done, not for the sheer glory of the 
thing, but because of its bearing upon human welfare. A different name for snow 
implies a different kind of hunt. Some names for snow imply that one should not 
hunt at all. And similarly, the names for typical, recurrent social situations are not 
developed out of “disinterested curiosity,” but because the names imply a command 





Burke continues by grouping various proverbs in to various categories based on the kind of 
things they do (i.e. vengeance, foretelling, sizing up, etc). He points out that different proverbs 
could belong to different categories; they could be used or interpreted in different ways. He 
says that the point is not to find the right categories but rather to look for categories that suggest 
the active nature of the proverb (296). That there are contradictory proverbs is not a problem 
because “apparent contradictions depend upon differences in attitude, involving a 
correspondingly different choice of strategy” (297). 
 What is important for Burke in his analysis is not the content of the proverb or its 
verification, but the implications for social action. He use of words like game and strategy 
suggest the impossibility of a neutral language. Rather, talk is treated as a methodological 
device, that itself forms a certain world with certain rules for action. Burke’s analysis 
demonstrates the idea that we can never be outside of the game of language, and that in saying 
anything we are demonstrating a strategy, an attitude. Literature, as equipment for living, 
references the notion that language forms both the world we live in and the rules and 
possibilities for such a world (302).  
 Burke shows that a sociological analysis can be applied to any material, be it literature, 
proverbs, or empirical data (293). He suggests a method of classification that references the 
general strategies, attitudes and recommendations for action, behind particular speech (303).  
 I will now turn to an analysis of the proverb “good fences make good neighbours” 
which can be understood as a strategy for dealing with the common situation of living with 
others who threaten our ability to experience a knowable world. It provides an answer to the 
problem of the problem neighbour in the form of a prescription – build a fence, strengthen 
boundaries, keep your world contained. I look at the world this proverb references including the 
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version of the good that it allows. I look at how the proverb formulates the neighbour, the good 





a barrier, railing, or other upright structure, typically of wood or wire, enclosing an 
area of ground to mark a boundary, control access, or prevent escape. 
Verb 
[ trans. ] (often be fenced) surround or protect with a fence : our garden was not 
fully fenced. 
• ( fence something in/off) enclose or separate with a fence for protection or to 
prevent escape : everything is fenced in to keep out the wolves. 
• ( fence someone/something out) use a barrier to exclude (New Oxford American 
Dictionary) 
 
Originating from the term defence, the word fence references a physical structure which blocks, 
controls, closes off, surrounds, protects, separates, excludes. The fence mediates a relationship 
with those near to us, and exists to prevent their influence or danger. It is a barrier, a physical 
manifestation of a boundary, intended to protect what it contains from what is exterior.  
If we look at mythical and historical manifestations of the fence as a method of defence 
from the terrifying Neighbour, we can have a good laugh. Historically, barriers were often 
massive and expensive undertakings, erected in times of serious crisis – and most of them 
failed completely: The city of Troy was tricked in to walling itself in with itd enemies through 
accepting a gift. France put nearly all of its resources into building the Magineau Line, and the 
Nazi’s went around it. The Berlin Wall, or Anti-Fascist Barrier, became completely ineffective 
the minute people stopped begrudgingly tolerating it.  
 If we return to our proverb “good fences make good neighbours,” we can come to the 
conclusion, that as a literal solution to the problem of the invasive bad neighbour, it is not so 
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great. That is, to take it literally, would be to ignore a historical, and in some ways, common 
sense lesson that if someone has a mind to infiltrate a fence, they can usually find a way. What 
we begin to see is that the fence can dangerously leave us with a false feeling of safety, and 
might actually make us more vulnerable to the invasion of the thing we sought protection from 
in the first place.  
 We cannot stop here. In fact, we should not. To do so, would be to confuse a literal 
interpretation with a serious one. Literally the proverb can be shown as recommending 
ineffective action. I use literal here in the sense that something can be taken factually – 
something that we can know empirically – i.e. to read this proverb  as a recommendation to go 
out and build a fence. My notion of seriousness in interpretation lies close to Blum’s (2003) or 
Bonner’s (1998) version of analysis which asks the theorist to get at the grounds of what is said 
and demands an ethical and political consideration of the consequences of the actions such 
grounds recommend. So, we need to look at the proverb and what it is saying in a way that does 
not merely accept it as literal advice. To treat it in this way we would have to ask after the 
meaning of three things: the notion of the good fence and neighbour, and the kind of world that 
would allow one to bring out goodness in the other (see Blum 2003).  
The Good Fence 
Perhaps a place to start is in fact with the everyday meaning of the good fence in the proverb. 
The notion of the good fence is often taken to mean the fence that is best at keeping the (bad) 
neighbour out. If you do not have to see them, hear them, deal with them, then the fence is 
doing its job.  
 The proverb has been quoted in real situations involving battling neighbours, and in 
such situations we are able to see how the notion of a good fence usually becomes associates 
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with a big fence. I am reminded of the most recent time I heard the proverb uttered was in an 
interview with Sarah Palin, as she explained the actions she took against her new neighbour, a 
journalist who was writing an unauthorized biography. Palin built a really big fence. She 
claimed to have done so to protect her privacy. Though there are no shortages of reasons to 
laugh at most things Sarah Palin does, my Master’s Thesis probably is not the place. But I will 
go so far as to say that the recognition of the Palin fence as humorous only underscores the 
collective notion that one should learn from history, and the comedic (or tragic) situation that 
ensues when such lessons are ignored. 
 The failure of the Palin fence seems to mimic the failure of large-scale political barriers, 
in that it can be overcome. Even if we ignore the hypocrisy of someone with a reality show 
meant to make a spectacle of her personal life building a privacy fence on one side of her yard, 
there is always the simple fact that should she wish to be in any part of the neighbourhood 
besides her fenced yard, her neighbour can see her. What we can learn from the Palin fence, or 
any instance of the literal interpretation of the good fences proverb, is that the desire for an 
effective barrier in a fence is only part of the story. 
 We must resist the temptation to define goodness, even with regards to a material 
object, in terms of its usefulness or effectiveness. This is not simply because the possibility that 
a fence might not do what we want it to do, but because usefulness and goodness are two 
different things. Such resistance involves a recognition of the good fence that is deeper than 
understanding a white picket fence as cute, or a giant wall’s effectiveness in keeping prisoners 
in one area, or a gate that prevents children from getting close to a pool. That is to say, we 




 So how then do we formulate the good fence as a strong answer to the problem of the 
Neighbour? Part of the answer to this question lies in how we orient to our relations with 
objects of the world. Hannah Arendt addresses this in her discussion of work in The Human 
Condition: 
It is this durability which gives the things of the world their relative independence 
from men who produce and use them, their “objectivity” which makes them 
withstand, “stand against” and endure, at least for a time, the voracious needs and 
wants of their living makers and users. From this viewpoint, the things of the world 
have the function of stabilizing human life, and their objectivity lies in the fact that 
– in contradiction to the Heraclitean saying that the same man can never enter the 
same stream – men, their ever-changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve their 
sameness, that is, their identity, by being related to the same chair and the same 
table. In other words, against the subjectivity of men stands the objectivity of the 
man-made world rather than the sublime indifference of an untouched nature, 
whose overwhelming elementary force, on the contrary, will compel them to swing 
relentlessly in the circle of their own biological movement, which fits so closely 
into the over-all cyclical movement of nature’s household (Arendt 1958, 137) 
 
Arendt is talking about objects as valuable in ways that go beyond our use for them. The value 
of an object seems to lie in its ability to stand up to our use of it, to our needs and desires, rather 
than its effectiveness at being used. Arendt claims that the things of the world have a stabilizing 
quality. Perhaps taking Arendt in to account, we can reconceptualize the idea of a fence as 
good, in so far as it endures our needs. While anxiety in the face of the Neighbour might bring 
out an urge to use an object, in this case, the fence, as a way to divide ourselves from the 
infection the Neighbour imposes, when we take Arendt in to account, we can no longer see the 
fence as merely a barrier as particularly good. Perhaps now we can say that the good fence can 
be talked of as good, and not just “good at” in so far as it stabilizes us in relation to the 
collective fate of an encounter with the Grey Zone in a shared world. The good fence, like 
Arendt’s table or chair, helps us to remember sameness in conditions of diversity. The good 
fence, therefore, is not the fence that is best at keeping the influence of the other out. The good 
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fence is good insofar as it enables an authentic experience with a knowable world – the deep 
need that the presence of the Neighbour interrupts – without denying the presence of otherness 
in the world. The good fence simultaneously brings us together and separates us simultaneously 
(Arendt 1958, Blum 2010).  
Making 
We usually take it for granted that people who consume our current output of books 
on “How to Buy Friends and Bamboozle Oneself and Other People” are reading as 
students who will attempt applying the recipes given. Nothing of the sort. The 
reading of a book on the attaining of success is in itself the symbolic attaining of 
that success. It is while they read hat these readers are “succeeding.” (Burke 1973, 
299, his italics) 
 
Like Burke’s actor who in reading about success attains it symbolically, we can understand the 
catharsis in the experience of actually building a fence to keep a hated or frightening or 
annoying neighbour at bay. If we revisit Sarah Palin, perhaps we can see her fence building as 
something beyond simply failed and hypocritical. In building it she was able to feel, at least 
symbolically, as though she had achieved the privacy and security she so greatly desired. The 
hope that it will solve anxiety in the face of the neighbour, and the pacification one gets from 
hoping this as she builds a fence almost seems reason enough to undertake fence building 
without any regard to its effectiveness or to its ability to separate and bring us together with 
others.  
 But Burke warns against confusing symbolic attainment with real life:  
The lure of the book resides in the fact that the reader, while reading it, is then 
living in the aura of success. What he wants is easy success; and he gets it in 
symbolic form by the mere reading itself. To attempt applying such stuff in real life 





So, while the making of a fence, like the reading of the book, might allow a temporary living 
situation in an aura of security or protection, in real life, we are faced with a situation that 
cannot be “solved” by erecting a barrier. Further, believing in an easy solution to a complex 
problem has the effect of making one more vulnerable than she should be.  
 We can formulate Burke’s reader and the fence builder as having a desire of controlling 
their future (either ensuring success, or ensuring a safe and knowable environment), and while 
the experience of success and safety are tasted in the act of the quick fix (reading, putting up a 
fence), the very complexity of the problem which triggered anxiety and the desire for a solution 
in the first place hits them harder and in a far more devastating way once they inevitably realize 
the failure of the quick fix to produce their desired end in real life.  
 Since the application of a fence as a protective barrier against the infection of the 
Neighbour is doomed from the outset, what must be developed is a strong version of fence 
building that includes an orientation to the idea of the good fence developed earlier. We know 
that the act of building allows the actor to have the symbolic experience of a knowable world 
free from the anxiety brought out by the neighbour. But the implication here is that the actor 
either mistakenly believes that the fence will offer more than symbolic protection after it is 
built – and the recognition that this is not so is in itself painful, or, the actor engages in an act 
which looks like a waste of time, if she knows what she is doing is only temporarily placating 
her anxiety.  
 However, if we cannot disregard that the making of something, the act of doing 
something, creates something real by creating something symbolic. Returning to the notion of 
the good fence we can start to develop how it might actually make a something worthwhile. 
This is possible when we remember the good fence’s capacity to separate and unite distinct 
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individuals. Thus, the good fence, makes the good neighbour through bringing us together 
without denying our difference, and through the allowance of a genuine experience with an 
aspect of a knowable world, in its solid, durable and unchanging (for a time) nature.  
The Good Neighbour and Infection 
If the problem of the bad neighbour in part is a problem of infection, but such an infection is 
unavoidable, and building a barrier against infection is a weak defence against it, then how is 
someone interested in either being a good neighbour or creating a good neighbour in the other, 
to orient to the notion of infection? Blum speaks to the problem of infection in the city, its 
potentially hystericizing effects, and the requirement of the actor who is moved in a meaningful 
way to commit herself to city life to develop in relation to the idea of inoculation:  
That we can become ill in the city (that is, become mad with the intoxicating excess 
of its effervescence; or more conventionally ‘hysterical’) suggests that urbanity has 
the capacity to produce both the coexisting temptations of freedom and evil. The 
sickness against which we must take precautions refers to ways in which we who 
are drawn to the city must inoculate ourselves from its effervescence and from the 
temptation to inflate the present moment as eternal and ourselves as free and 
sufficient. This extremism in response to condition is, according to Durkheim, a 
feature of the vitality of social life and its forces; such prompting into opposite 
directions is part of the overstimulating character of the social, bringing us together 
by pulling us in all sorts of different directions… (Blum, 2010) 
 
His version of inoculation in the city involves a resistance of the temptation to wrongly believe 
in our absolute freedom and sufficiency. It requires also a genuine acknowledgement of the 
whole, despite its fundamental ambiguity. This allows a deepening of an earlier formulation of 
the good fence that demands it not only move past being only a barrier against infection, but 
that it in some way allow a part of the terrifying otherness of the Neighbour to seep through in 
a way that is intended, and thus not by accident. The fence as barrier alone in light of Blum’s 
quote can no longer stand up as a good fence at all. Not because it can be permeated, but 
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because it denies permeation in the first place, preventing the actor from developing the 
inoculation against the maddening potential of the city. The good fence is not one that succeeds 
in protecting us from anxiety, but one that enables a moderate relation to the intoxicating 
effects of city life, including the encounter with the bad neighbour.  
 
Discretion 
I have left the notion of tolerating the neighbour, intentionally, as it removes the conversation 
from the realm of the political (!i"ek 2008). An orientation to tolerance can be seen as a 
barrier, and therefore, as an answer to the problem of anxiety over the Grey Zone which the 
neighbour brings out avoids any meaningful interaction with the other. Tolerance kills dialogue 
in accepting otherness without any interest in engaging it, and thus resembles in effect the 
barrier fence, and is prone to the same failures. The implication here is that under the auspices 
of tolerance, communication with the neighbour, while seemingly an opposite of fencing can 
have the same disillusioning results of the fence built only to protect. In a lecture given at the 
Tilton Gallery in 2008 in New York (viewable on Youtube) !i"ek suggests as an alternative 
discretion:  
What I think we need today is not more communication – we should begin more 
modestly with more distance. We need a new code of discretion. We need to learn 
to be more like foreigners, to ignore others more. I think this is the great art today, 
although, of course, some boring Marxist would say this is alienation. It is, but 
there is something to alienation. 
 
If, according to !i"ek, what we need is to develop in relation to the art of ignoring others, we 
can again return to the ideas of the good fence, and of inoculation in light of how they can aid 
us in such an undertaking. The implication is that part of city life, if it is to be in any way 
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healthy, requires of the actor a development of the capacity to ignore the Neighbour, and it 
seems from the earlier discussion that inoculation can perhaps help us to do this.  
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Chapter 6. Revisiting the Problem of the Neighbour, and the Bad Neighbour 
in Relation to The Grey Zone  
When I decided that this work would be a theoretical piece on the problem of the 
neighbour, rather than the research study I had originally planned (which itself was still 
theoretical in nature, but more of a focused case study), I took to the Internet to get a feel for 
the some every day talk about bad neighbours. A Google news search for bad neighbour 
Canada was overwhelmed by two categories of articles: the first collection of stories concerned 
hoarders- people who collect “junk” to the point that their homes could be condemned as health 
and safety risks.  Perhaps because of their exposure in two new reality shows and on the talk 
show circuit, hoarders seem to be the popular version of the bad neighbour at this moment (the 
new smoker, pesticide user, party animal). 
The other group of articles covered the Russel Williams murders, and the community 
reaction to them. I initially ignored these, figuring that they came up because they were recent, 
and because “Canada”, “bad” and “neighbour” were probably in there haphazardly (i.e. as a 
hypothetical example: “‘No one thought he was a bad guy’ recalls a neighbour”). After more 
thought, and some interesting conversations with my supervisor and peers, I began thinking 
about the very particular way in which the Williams case is almost essential to my analysis.  
One of the key themes of this thesis has been the danger of the hysterical reaction to the 
problem of anxiety in the face of the unknown or Grey Zone that appears in an interaction with 
the bad neighbour, or any neighbour. Part of the argument is that the city has a way of resisting 
a formulation of the Neighbour’s otherness as something that would ruin a place. Perhaps the 
most apt reflection of this idea is Wirth’s statement that “only rarely is [the city-dweller] a true 
neighbour” (1938, 157). The fact that the city as a home for diversity makes itself home to the 
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bad neighbour has required an orientation to the bad neighbour in a way that addresses the 
problem of dealing with diversity rather than its removal. Or at least this is how it must be 
approached if we are to respect the city as a site of freedom (Simmel, 1971). 
To dismiss all fear with regard to one’s neighbours as hysterical reactions to anxiety 
would be as problematic as taking all fears of the neighbours at their face value. What has yet 
to be developed is the idea of the Neighbour who could actually destroy a community. This 
forces us to turn back to the complaint of diversity as destroying the neighbourhood, which we 
dismissed earlier, and examine its potential for being true, even in the city. Doing so in a strong 
way, requires a committed acknowledgement of the Grey Zone and of the potential of the 
Neighbour to destroy a community. 
Russell Williams as the Destructive Neighbour with No Cure 
What is both frustrating and terrifying about Russell Williams is that his case does not allow us 
to take such comfort in having an explanation for no explanation. Williams’ position in the 
military ensured that he was carefully tested for the types of problems that show up in post-hoc 
testing of murderers:  
Col. Williams was part of a rarified group. Canada has fewer than 100 Air Force 
colonels…. “The thing about a guy in his position is we observed him over decades 
in a wide variety of jobs and positions to make sure he’s the right individual for 
such a high-stress and high-responsibility job, and we select these people very, very 
carefully,” said the retired of the air staff Angus Watt. 
“If there’s the slightest hint of any wrongdoing or character weakness in somebody, 
we do not appoint him to a position of this magnitude. It’s just not done. … It’s an 
objective process, and obviously, we missed something here.” (The Globe and 
Mail, February 8, 2010) 
 
We can formulate Watt as a character whose recognition of the limits of objectivity renders him 
incapable of sensible speech. That he says “it’s just not done…” in reference to appointing 
someone who turned out to be a depraved lunatic to the post of colonel, his tone can be read as 
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a sadness that it was done, and a lament that those objective processes failed them in this 
instance. Watt admits that something was missed, but is unable to accept the real failure of an 
objective approach to understanding evil. 
 Williams stands out as the bad neighbour who could actually ruin a community. He is 
the neighbour who we cannot develop immunity to. The story of his murders shows us the very 
real danger of the truly barbaric neighbour. He exemplifies the neighbour whom we cannot 
treat with the humanity that is demanded in the definition of neighbour, and thus presents a 
challenge to a liberalistic treatment of the neighbour. In the face of such a neighbour, the need 
for protection goes deeper than economic protection. 
He represents the broken scientific promise of protection through detection. In the wake 
of inexplicable tragedies, the modern impulse is to try to explain them, and failing that, they try 
to explain why there is no explanation. The lament often takes the form of  “if only we had 
known.” When an ordinary person engages in an act of extraordinary evil, experts are generally 
called upon after the fact to perform evaluations on the person’s psyche and character. Usually 
abnormalities show up, and the conclusion is drawn that their behaviour could have been 
predicted had they undergone such testing before the act of evil was committed. We often 
accept this answer, without asking why such testing was done before hand due to the 
understanding that most people are good, and that it is impossible (too expensive, to time 
consuming, not to mention an unjustified invasion of privacy ) to test everyone to see if they 
show signs of psychopathology. Our comfort is derived from the fact that at least the lack of 
testing explains the lack of ability to detect and prevent the evil. We feel good knowing that we 
could have known, we could have predicted, even though in this instance we did not.  
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 In addition to attempts to pacify ourselves with knowing we could have predicted an 
atrocity, should we have had the time or resources, the statistical rarity of serial killers, like 
Russell Williams is often used as a cure for the fear that these kinds of people bring out. In 
other words, if the hidden character of evil becomes knowable when a monster like Williams is 
discovered, there is often a parallel conversation about the obscurity of such a case. The 
implication being that it is unlikely that another monster lives near you, as there are so few in 
the world. As a consolation, this argument changes the conversation. It denies the foundation 
shattering experience of the appearance of evil, and moves talk to the realm of likelihoods. 
What is terrifying about Williams is not that there could be more like him. He is terrifying 
because he reminds us that we can never really know our neighbour, or future, or really 
anything we depend on as true. The revelation of the monster who walks among us, in a very 
fundamental way, forces a recognition that what we don’t know sometimes can hurt us, and our 
powerlessness in the face of such randomness. Like the reminder that one is statistically more 
likely to die being trampled by a donkey than in a plane crash, the idea that the Russell 
Williams of the world are few and far between does nothing about the real problem of anxiety 
that any horrific incident, no matter how rare, can bring out. 
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The Stealth Evildoer 
One day after he strangled his second murder victim in January, Jessica Lloyd, 
former air base commander Colonel Russell Williams flew with some of his troops 
to a training exercise in California. Only three days later did he return to his 
lakeside cottage in Tweed, north of here, retrieve her body and dump it in a patch of 
nearby woods.  
 
Hours after he killed his first target the previous November, Cpl. Marie-France 
Comeau, an air attendant under his command at the big 8 Wing/CFB Trenton base, 
he drove to Ottawa for a meeting about the purchase of a C-17 transport plane.  
 
The terrifying ease with which the murderous colonel could resume his pose as a 
normal human being on the heels of committing two savage sex killings only 
underscored hours of searing court evidence so graphic and disgusting that it left 
many in the packed courtroom weeping. (Appleby and McArthur 2010) 
 
Here we have three paragraphs, from an article in The Globe and Mail detailing the Williams 
case.  The first two describe Williams committing a horrific crime and then going on to 
participate normally in society in his position as colonel. The third brings out the terror in the 
recognition that someone could be both a monster and a high-functioning, normal human being. 
The revelation that he not only was guilty of evil acts, but that he was able to go on 
participating in main stream society, undetected as a villain, seems to throw salt in the wounds 
of his victims, their families and the community of Tweed. In other words, the evil act itself 
becomes more horrifying in combination with normalcy.  
 The quotes reflect a dimension to the Williams case and others like it in which our 
horror is more than a reaction to the act of the individual – perhaps even more upsetting is the 
thought of the potential for evil to exist unnoticed where we least expect it. That Williams’ 
public persona did not fit the picture of the “knife-wielding-maniac” we might expect this kind 
of behaviour from is the real source of fear. And Williams stands out as someone who we 
should fear, someone with no morality, no respect for the gift of life, someone who is quite 
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simply evil. And yet this evil, though so clear after the damage has been done, was so hidden 
before. Our encounter with the gap between the known and unknown in thinking about the 
Williams case is far more horrific, as it reminds us outright of that the Grey Zone contains 
possibilities for evil as well as good.  
The Pain of a Confrontation with Duality 
That what should be feared can adopt the form of the familiar is one of the problems dealt with 
in Daniel Defoe’s novel A Journal of the Plague Year: 
Here also I ought to leave a further remark for the use of posterity, concerning the 
manner of people’s infecting one another; namely, that it was not the sick people 
only from whom the plague was immediately received by others that were sound, 
but the well. To explain myself: by the sick people I mean those who were known 
to be sick, had taken their beds, had been under cure, or had swellings and tumours 
upon them and the like; these everybody could beware of; they were either in their 
beds or in such condition as could not be concealed.  
 By the well I mean such as had received the contagion and had it really upon 
them, and in their blood, yet did not show the consequences of it in their 
countenances nay, even were not sensible of it themselves, as many were not for 
several days. These breathed death in every place, and upon everybody who came 
near them; nay, their very clothes retained the infection, their hands would infect 
the things they touched, especially if they were warm and sweaty, and they were 
generally apt to sweat too (1966, 202).  
 
Defoe’s character’s warning reflects a basic problem of life: what is potentially dangerous to us 
can take the form of something known. The reflection on the plague and its victims includes the 
recognition of its hidden character. The obviously sick could be avoided, contained, and 
separated. But the plague spread because of the well. Those within whom the infection was 
hidden became the vessels for its transfer. Truly frightening is the thought of death concealed in 
their clothes, their sweat and their breath.  
 The implication for the problem of anxiety in the face of the Neighbour, is that it should 
not only come out when we have a particularly bad neighbour. Defoe’s passage reminds us of 
70 
 
the problem of the not so obvious character of what we should really fear. It reminds us that 
merely avoiding obviously unpleasant or even dangerous people, will never solve the problem 
of anxiety, simply because of the existence of illusions of wellness.  
 I am not using Williams or Defoe as a way to make an argument that we are doomed to 
live in fear. However, Russell Williams, and “the well” in Defoe’s passage bring out the 
problem that what should be feared hides itself well. The kernel of terrifying otherness 
contained in !i"ek’s formulation of the Neighbour, can, in a very real way contain something 
evil or something destructive, and we are faced with the problem that we might never know 
until it is too late. 
 It is this lost dimension of horror in the face of the gap that !i"ek tries to bring out in 
any of his analyses of the Neighbour. Rather than account for how the actor is able to manage 
multiple roles, !i"ek’s strength is in his recognition of the problem of the sudden and often 
painful recognition of otherness in someone we thought we knew well. He sums this problem 
up in the preface to the latest edition of The Plague of Fantasies:  
When we think we really know a close friend or relative, it often happens that, all 
of a sudden, this person does something – utters an unexpectedly vulgar or cruel 
remark, makes an obscene gesture, casts a cold indifferent glance where 
compassion was expected – making us aware that we do not really know him: we 
become suddenly aware that there is a total stranger in front of us. At this point the 
fellow man changes into a Neighbour (2008a, vii) 
 
The point at which the fellow man changes into a Neighbour is an instance in which the Grey 
Zone is made visible in a real and painful way. !i"ek brings out the pain of looking at someone 
you think you know, and for whatever reason, only being able to see them as a stranger. And 
!i"ek’s formulation of the recognition of the gap in this way does not even need to be 
experienced with someone we think we know well. When we see a total stranger in someone 
we think we could know well, someone we hypothetically should trust we can feel as betrayed. 
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In other words, it is not the subjective details of any given situation in which we experience the 
Grey Zone that is painful, but the form in which the experience takes. The pain is in the 
recognition that we never really knew something or someone we thought we did.  
 Thus, any theory that only serves to explain how it is possible for the social actor to 
maintain multiple statuses, even deviant ones, with varying degrees of success, does not (and is 
not equipped to) examine the (reflexive) experience of the recognition of otherness in someone 
we thought we knew. Such mere explanations do not help us with the problem of an encounter 
with someone we should know or should trust engaging in action that is both foreign and denies 
the something that we once thought essential to their character.  
A Call to Heal 
 A healing relation to anxiety includes a recognition of its place in the whole. Anxiety is 
a response to the potentially terrifying side of the unknown. To heal in relation to anxiety to 
some extent requires an acknowledgment of our limits in knowledge. It requires an acceptance 
of our limitedness with regards to our future. But the notion of healing means a relation that 
does not allow anxiety to overcome us. If anxiety is a reflection of our fear over what we 
cannot know, but what might be, then to succumb to fear and believe truly in something we 
cannot know, is pathological in and of itself. This means that we cannot deny anxiety and its 
place as a real part of the human experience. We cannot and should not try to “cure” it, as such 
an attempt would be a move away from our genuine experience of being in the world. Rather, 
those of us with an interest in health are called to think about anxiety as something we must 
orient to in a strong way at various points in life. The Neighbour presents us with a situation 
where we must work out a relation to anxiety, and in such a way, the gift of the Neighbour 
might not be a cure for loneliness, but a chance to work out a relation to anxiety over the 
72 
 
unknown, in a concrete way. It is in our relations with others around us that we are required to 
face uncertainty and learn to live with it in a way that is good.  
 Such an orientation might ask us to resist !i"ek’s dichotomy of the fellow man and the 
Neighbour, as any orientation to the whole would recognize that each contains a kernel of the 
other. In using the word Neighbour as a word for the Other (2000, 2008a, 2008b) , !i"ek must 
have some interest in formulating Other as something beyond otherness. As was touched on 
earlier, the term neighbour in its political sense depends on a notion of fellowship, and to 
separate this from any formulation of the Neighbour is in some way to deny its roots. 
Therefore, in the same way that we must recognize the Grey Zone in any neighbour, we must 
be able to understand some sense of fellowship and unity in the Neighbour, even if it is only 





The accusation that this analysis has brought up more problems than solutions would not be 
incorrect. That problem solving was not the goal of this work should be apparent, and yet once 
revealed, any problem demands an attempt at an answer. Bonner (1998) argues that it is the 
lens of our modern, production-oriented society that allows us to recognize the notion of a 
problem as implicitly asking for a solution that fixes it. He, in turn, orients to a problem as a 
deep need, and as such, gives the idea of a problem a dimension beyond solutions. This 
dimension includes a question of how we might act in relation to a fundamental lack, in relation 
to what we cannot and perhaps should not even attempt to solve:  
If ambiguity is essential, a universal, any approach to ambiguity must participate in 
its topic, must be infected by the very ambiguity it studies. If such research is not to 
claim an exemption from ambiguity in a dogmatic gesture, it must propose to 
preserve ambiguity in its very manner; part of the appeal of the inquiry mist reside in 
how it mediates ambiguity as a topic and resource without denying its two-sidedness 
or passively resigning itself to ambiguity whether out of disrespect, indifference or 
blindness (Blum 2010, 46) 
 
Throughout this paper I have tried to resist the temptation to take a solution based approach to 
any of the problems that have been uncovered. One of the lessons in doing this has been that 
any serious treatment of ambiguity, like Blum says above, has the effect of making things more 
complex. While seemingly disconnected, each chapter in this thesis is oriented to not only 
discovering and describing how the Grey Zone appears in a particular case, but to preserving 
ambiguity while seeking to develop a less painful relation to it. Thus, to heal in relation to 
ambiguity requires a participation in it rather than avoiding it.  
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 In each chapter, what at first appears as a problem with the neighbour was deepened and 
developed drawing from theory, and interpretive methods. What I tried to show each time was 
that the deep problem is not a problem with the neighbour, but a problem of not knowing how 
to cope with the unknown. However, if, according to theorists like Blum, Bonner and !i"ek, 
among others, ambiguity is essential to any phenomenon, the theorist is obliged to treat 
ambiguity itself as a topic. The cases in this study were not selected hap-hazardly, but for the 
way in which they showed ambiguity in a way that could be theorized through the problem of 
anxiety in the face of a neighbour.  
 Thus, I tried to look at the problem of the possibility of hysteria as a response to anxiety 
over the unknown. I looked at how this can be generated in situations where our need for a 
knowable world is threatened, especially in the city, by a particularly problematic neighbour. I 
tried to show the need to develop the problems expressed in the passages I used beyond what 
can easily be taken for granted, in order to approach the deep problem with a mind to cure, and 
avoid the danger of a hysterical solution to a hysterical problem.  
 I looked at theories that deal deeply with the problem of living with otherness, and how 
this is both a condition of life, and puts at risk our ability to feel at home. What appeared in this 
conversation was a need not only to feel at home (in the city) but to feel at home with what 
might threaten feeling at home. To feel at home with anxiety is in a way needed, as despite its 
painfulness, anxiety is part of a life in which there is knowledge of death.  
 I look at how an overwhelming neighbour, or neighbours can create a sense of stigma 
on an entire neighbourhood, and how this sense of stigma is possible even in a place as diverse 
as the city. I attempted to show how the encounter with a methadone culture was deeply an 
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encounter with our limits in controlling our environment, and even our health and well being in 
the city.  
 My analysis of the proverbial fence as a solution to the problem of the neighbour 
attempted to show that when used to treat the symptom i.e. when used to prevent an encounter 
with a “bad neighbour” the fence easily appears weak. My aim in this chapter was to develop a 
theoretical idea of a barrier that would provide a strong way of dealing with the anxiety over 
the unknown that the neighbour generates. Using Blum and !i"ek’s formulations of infection 
and discretion, I tried to orient to the idea of a boundary that might allow us to practice the arts 
of inoculation against infection and discretion. I looked at the fence as an object of the world 
(Arendt, 1958) that is able to provide an experience of similarity in a changing and unknowable 
reality. I tried to argue that the need for boundaries, inoculation and discretion reflects an idea 
of healing in relation to anxiety rather than getting rid of it.  
 Finally, I looked at the Russell Williams case as a way of formulating the neighbour 
that can really ruin a place, a neighbour that presents a real danger, a real need for defence. The 
problem of the neighbour who can do real damage, is that unlike the noisy neighbour or the 
methadone clinic, such a neighbour operates in a way that we cannot detect. The terrifying idea 
that there could be unknown and undetectable evil in our presence asks us to reorient to the 
Grey Zone in a way that makes anxiety not only inevitable, but as something more than 
pathological. I tried to use the Williams case as an argument for strong mindfulness of the 
possibilities for good and evil that exist in anything unknown.  
 Several questions have come up in my analysis of the problem of the neighbour. The 
main problem that has come out is one of the anxiety that the bad neighbour brings out in us in 
relation to our need to feel at home in the world. The Neighbour reminds us of our limits. We 
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can formulate fear of the bad neighbour, deeply, as a fear of facing the irresolute gap that is the 
Grey Zone. I have tried to show that it is hysterical to imagine the encounter with the Grey 
Zone as fatal, and thus orient to fixing or solving it. The problem with such an approach is two-
fold. First, it ignores the fundamentality of the Grey Zone and its existence as a part of any 
social phenomenon. Secondly, an approach to “solving” the problem of the neighbour has the 
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